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Abstract 
Toward Perpetual Peace is Immanuel Kant's treatise on international peace. The 
argumentative strategy of the text is aimed at increasing the likelihood of peace 
by reducing the risk sovereign nations face when attempting to trust one another. 
As part of the risk reduction strategy Kant prohibits nations from keeping secrets. 
Secrets erode trust and thus jeopardize the movement toward perpetual peace. 
Having established this, Kant issues the Secret Article for Perpetual Peace which 
allows the sovereign to benefit from the counsel of an educated citizenry without 
acknowledging their influence and, in effect, he receives counsel in secret. Kant 
acknowledges the contradiction yet defends it, claiming that public consultation is 
damaging to the sovereign's dignity and thus must be conducted in secret. 
Although the dignity defense is ultimately a self-refuting and, therefore, 
inadequate grounds for the secret article, this thesis argues that the article can 
be understood as being commensurate with Kant's project of enlightenment. I 
resolve the contradiction by reading the article in the context of What is 
Enlightenment?. Not only is the article coherent in this context, it necessarily 
creates a range of action beyond the contractual limitations dictated by the 
private obligations of the social contract to empower the sovereign to take 
possession of his reason and become an enlightened public thinker. This is the 
secret education ensured by the secret article. 
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Introduction 
A Well Kept Secret or an Ignored Inconsistency 
It is not surprising that Perpetual Peace should be Kant's most 
popular work. What is more difficult to explain is its relative neglect 
by rigorous scholarship. Perpetual Peace has not received the 
same intense treatment given to his more systematic writings on 
the foundations of knowledge or morality, or even to Kant's thinking 
on mathematics, physics, aesthetics, politics or religion. This 
cannot be explained by saying that as a piece of popular writing, 
Perpetual Peace is simple and unproblematic, its arguments so 
plain and straightforward that it needs no exegesis or critical 
discussion. On the contrary, the text bristles with problems which 
have scarcely been noticed, let alone solved (Wood 9). 
This is an excerpt from Allen Wood's address to the opening session of 
the Eighth International Kant Congress in 1995. In commemoration of the two 
hundredth anniversary of its publication Perpetual Peace was chosen as the 
theme for the conference and this meeting of Kant scholars in Memphis marked 
a watershed in the study of Kant's treatise on international relations. Since 
Wood's claim that the text has been neglected by serious scholarship, there has 
been an increasing interest among philosophers in Perpetual Peace. While 
Wood's claim that philosophy has been a Johnny come lately with respect to 
Kant's Perpetual Peace appears to be true, there has nonetheless been a 
steadily growing interest in the text since the Eighth International Kant Congress 
at which Wood spoke. 
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The second edition of Kant's Perpetual Peace featured the addition of a 
secret article. The secret article allows the sovereign to benefit from the counsel 
of an educated citizenry without acknowledging their influence and thus, in effect, 
he receives counsel in secret. This addendum presents some serious and 
troubling challenges for the coherence of the text. The article contradicts 
substantial portions of the text and Kant himself acknowledges that it is an 
objective contradiction to negotiations of public right (Peace 337). Kant defends 
this subterfuge by claiming that public consultation is damaging to the 
sovereign's dignity. However as I will show this defense is self-refuting in light of 
Kant's account of dignity. 
In spite of the growing interest in Perpetual Peace since Allen Wood's 
presentation, there has been little or no serious scholarship devoted to 
understanding the secret article for perpetual peace. Rather scholars either 
ignore the article altogether, or they read it as ironic and thus dismiss its 
importance. 
This thesis argues that resolution of the contradiction requires a non-ironic 
approach to the secret article. It will specifically argue that the "secret article for 
perpetual peace" enables the enlightenment of the sovereign. The secrecy of the 
article appears to be in contradiction to Kant's expressed prohibition against state 
secrets. However, focusing on the enlightenment and the sovereignty of the 
monarch enables the reader to resolve this apparent contradiction by situating 
Vll 
both the secret article and Perpetual Peace in the context of Kant's overall 
project of enlightenment. 
Even though Wood complains that philosophy has been remiss in failing to 
address Perpetual Peace it has nevertheless had substantial impact within the 
discipline of political science and its sub-disciplines of international relations and 
peace and conflict studies. The debates within the field of international relations 
are relevant to this thesis because of their discussion of realist and idealist 
theories of international politics. I conclude that the secret article is a necessary 
requirement for idealist politics based on my reading of the secret article, which 
argues that the article provides for the enlightenment of the sovereign. 
An extensive treatment of the foundational role Kant's essay has had on 
the field of international relations can be found in Mark Franke, Global Limits: 
Immanuel Kant, International Relations, and Critique of World Politics. He 
argues that the discursive poles of the debate's realist and idealist theories of 
international relations have Perpetual Peace as their theoretical pedigree. Franke 
notes that idealist theorist often identify themselves and are identified by others 
as being closely aliened with Kant. He states that, 
Kant's name [is] generally presented with international relations 
literature as signs for the pinnacle of an idealism against which a 
tradition of political realism entrenches itself. In this fashion, he is 
conventionally received within the discipline as the fundamental 
proponent of and anchor for a naive spirit who proposes and 
predicts an eventual evolution of international relations toward a 
Vlll 
world-wide peaceful federation of states, wherein basic agreement 
and consensus may be achieved among all peoples (Franke 16).1 
Franke claims that, "Despite the variety of approaches that fall within the 
broad discourse that constitutes modern theories of international relations, they 
all ultimately reproduce ways of expressing the limits of human experience and 
reason as articulated by Kant" (Franke 6). Franke is primarily concerned with the 
link between sovereignty and knowledge at the core of Kant's republicanism. He 
summarizes Kant's position as follows; a republic is "a state that, ideally, gains its 
unity through the will of the people at large, not simply at the will or interest of the 
monarch, aristocracy, or rrfajority. Hence, the republic is truly sovereign in itself 
and, thus, self-legitimizing" (Franke 8). Franke goes on to quote from Jens 
Bartelsom's, A Genealogy of Sovereignty, which expresses the link as follows: 
"sovereignty and knowledge implicate each other logically and produce each 
other historically" (8). This is something of a controversial claim since realist 
theorists, who make power relationships the central explanatory feature of 
international relations, have criticized and defined themselves in opposition to 
Kant's rationalism. Within international relations and political science 
departments Kant is often portrayed as an idealist who prefers international 
government to state power. Franke argues that Perpetual Peace contains 
ammunition for either camp and sets the limits of the debate and thereby defining 
the discipline. Furthermore, he argues that scholars on both sides have 
1 Agreement and consensus are the defining traits of the idealist position and they differentiate the idealist 
camp from a realist position which have force and power as defining traits. 
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practised selective citation and revisionist interpretation, and moreover, in spite 
of its foundational status they have not devoted sufficient scholarly efforts to 
examining Perpetual Pace, preferring instead to use it as a source of authority. 
In a section entitled "The Need for Philosophical Reflection", Franke states, 
what is perhaps of even greater concern is the fact that little in the 
way of serious self-reflection is manifest among those international 
relations scholars who draw on Perpetual Peace. As Kantian 
positions are assumed and often uncritically promoted with this 
literature, so is it the case that paltry attention is paid to the 
intellectual commitments underlying the various shades of 
international relations theory (61 ). 
Whether or not Allen Wood was including political science and 
international relations in his account of serious scholarship I cannot say. 
However, even if Wood was not thinking of the idealist/realist debate within the 
sphere of international relations studies, the schedule of speakers at the 
Memphis Congress included presentations that address the realist/idealist 
debate in a philosophical context, specifically Daniel Breazeale and George 
Geismann's papers, "'More than a Pious Wish': Fichte on Kant on Perpetual 
Peace" (943-59) and "On the Philosophical Unique Realism of Kant's Doctrine of 
Eternal Peace" (273-89) respectively. Both of these papers address the 
legalistic approach of Kant's theory of international relations based in the 
sovereign right of states. They look to his legalism to reveal what Geismann 
calls Kant's unique realism. Kant's unique realism is his response to realist 
theorists who, as I previously stated, view power as the manifold for 
understanding relationships between states. Kant's realism is based on sufficient 
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legal conditions for peace rather than being contingent on the good will of 
individuals and thus is not subject to piety. He demonstrates this by making the 
argument that the rights of states are established in the same fashion as 
individuals. Geismann asserts that, 
what has been said about individual men in the state of nature is 
also true for States. Before a civil condition is established, they too 
are in a juridical state of war of all against all. And this, again, is 
totally independent of how moral people are. Thus, with regard to 
the external relations among States, the Right of humanity and 
possible acquired rights still remain insecure until these relations, 
too, are regulated by pubic Right. Therefore, practical reason 
declares it to be an unconditional Ouridical) duty also of States to 
accord with one another. They have to give up their 'state of 
externally lawless freedom' (276). 
He asserts that even though Kant's solution is not grounded in the state of 
nature it is nevertheless a realist theory because it is an outline for attainable 
international relations. Geismann claims that "the problem of establishing peace 
is soluble for mankind because mere rules of expediency are sufficient" (264). 
This having been said, the unique realism of the legal solution is not without 
problems and is particularly vulnerable to the kind of criticism Hegel launched 
against Perpetual Peace claiming the sovereign was purely mechanical on Kant's 
account. Sovereigns are seen as robotic figureheads presiding, in light of 
Geismann's argument, over mechanistic states which interlock in the matrix of 
international law. While there are merits to Hegel's criticism, and Geismann's 
praise, mechanical readings of Kant's political philosophy neglect to account for 
the free use of reason in his thought. Even though Kant set out clear moral laws 
Xl 
to guide human behavior, their application is not always clear and they require 
the judgment of free individuals. In matters of state the free judgment of the 
sovereign is of paramount importance. After all, Kant believes, it is they who will 
negotiate a lasting peace. As a result of my reading of the secret article as 
facilitating the enlightenment of the sovereign, the problems of a mechanical 
sovereign appear throughout this thesis. Most notably Chapter Three of this 
thesis builds on the analysis of Kant's defense of the Article presented in my 
Chapter Two in order to explore the linkage between legalistic readings of 
Perpetual Peace and the specific shortcomings of such readings to ground an 
idealist politics. I conclude by suggesting that purely legalistic accounts in fact 
destabilize Kant's project in ways of which Kant was aware and warned against. 
However, debates in political philosophy concerning Perpetual Peace are 
not limited to the idealist/realist controversy and formal legal discussions. They 
also encompass more specific discussions about the nature of world 
government, as well as, civil society and the public sphere. Sidney Axinn 
presented a paper at the Sixth International Kant Congress, entitled, "Kant on 
World Government." In 1995 James Bohman presented a paper to the Eighth 
Congress on cultural issues entitled, "The Public Sphere of the World Citizen," 
and since then he has addressed the topic of cosmopolitanism in his 1998 essay, 
"The Globalization of the Public Sphere: Cosmopolitan Publicity and the 
Problems of Cultural Pluralism." 
xu 
The appendices to Perpetual Peace address the relationship between 
morals and politics. There is the moral and legal question about the duty to 
promote peace. This is a complicated issue for scholars of Perpetual Peace 
given that Kant is clear that the sovereignty of independent nations ought to be 
respected and they ought to be free from external intervention. That being said, 
there are compelling arguments for nations to take it upon themselves to 
intercede in the affairs of other nations in the name of peace. These debates 
have been explored in essays such as Harry Van der Linder's paper, "Kant, the 
Duty to Promote International Peace and Political Intervention." 
In addition to the question of the duty to promote peace Kant also 
contends with the role of moral reason in political decision making in the 
appendices to the text in which he introduces the distinction between the moral 
politician and the political moralist. The moral politician is one who acts in 
accordance with the moral law, while the political moralist uses seemingly moral 
justifications to further his or her heteronomous desires. 
While some commentators have focused on the role of the moral law in 
Kant's theory of international relations, others have chosen to examine the theory 
in relation to Kant's rationalism. They address questions about the rational 
foundations of Toward Perpetual Peace. This question is related to an account of 
the education and enlightenment of the sovereign central to this thesis and thus 
the question is both impacted by and has impact upon the importance of the 
secret article. Both Arto Siitonen and Willem van der Kuijlen explore questions in 
xiii 
their essays, "Transcendental Reasoning in Kant's Treatise on Perpetual Peace," 
and "The Politics of Reason: The Theoretical Background to Perpetual Peace 
and Secrecy." 
Mark Franke's Global Limits, has been the most comprehensive survey of 
political thought related to Perpetual Peace since the Congress and even more 
recently Peter Fenves', Late Kant: Towards Another Law of the Earth, analyses 
the importance of the metaphor of failure represented by the graveyard on the 
innkeeper's sign at the beginning of Perpetual Peace as instrumental for creating 
a rhetorical space for its publication and acceptance in 1795. Fenves' analysis 
depends on the ironic and satirical connotations of the innkeeper's sign to 
demonstrate Kant's rhetorical strategy of making his work appear innocuous and 
thus less threatening to the power of heads of state. Fenves writes, "as long as 
the project Kant Proposes in Toward Eternal Peace is understood as nothing 
more than a 'sweet dream,' as long as it is understood as a failure from the start, 
there can be no reasonable objection to its publication"(93). 
Although Fenves is novel in his use of irony, he is not the only scholar to 
comment on irony in Perpetual Peace. He does not follow the lead of other 
commentators, such as, Siitonen and van der Kuijlen, who ignore the interpretive 
symbology of the innkeeper's sign and focus instead on Kant's Secret Article for 
Perpetual Peace as the locus of irony in the text. These two argue that Kant is 
being ironic with the secret article and thus dismissed its importance in a manner 
not unlike that which Fenves applies to the dismissal of the text in general. 
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Rather than addressing the secret article Fenves, like Franke who examines 
every other section of Perpetual Peace, completely ignores the secret article. 
This lack of scholarship on the secret article is most problematic because 
the article contradicts an explicit rejection of secrets by the Transcendental 
Concept of Public Right contained in Perpetual Peace. Arguments that depend 
on the Transcendental Concept of Pubic Right, such as Siitonen's argument that 
the public use of reason can resolve problems with the compatibility of moral 
laws and political realism, completely fall apart if the contradiction presented by 
the secret article is not resolved. Furthermore, Siitonen's solution neglects to 
acknowledge the importance of an enlightened sovereign because he provides a 
mechanical solution. He relies too heavily on the procedural and legalist 
resolution he finds in the Transcendental Concept of Public Right and thus 
dismisses the secret article because it does not fit neatly into a clockwork reading 
of Perpetual Peace. By contrast, this thesis contends that ignorance and irony 
are not sufficient solutions to the contradiction presented by the article. If 
scholarship is to flourish and develop a comprehensive account of Perpetual 
Peace which is compatible with Kant's philosophy, then the secret article must be 
taken seriously and its purpose understood. I propose that the contradiction can 
be resolved by appealing to Kant's analysis of the public and private uses of 
reason in his answer to the question What is Enlightenment?. 
The first chapter of this thesis discusses the foundational position of trust 
in Kant's understanding of international relationships, introduces the reader to the 
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articles for Perpetual Peace, and concludes with an analysis of Kant's unique 
understanding of the unnatural character of international peace and thus the 
reasons why Kant must argue for a movement towards perpetual peace. 
The second chapter outlines and examines three arguments for peace 
found in the text and criticizes Kant's defense of the secret article by exposing 
how the defense undermines his arguments for peace. 
The third and final chapter provides an alternative solution to the 
contradiction of the secret article by examining What is Enlightenment? It 
concludes with a discussion of why Kant would chose to publish Toward 
Perpetual Peace with the inferior subjective defense for the secret article. 
This thesis concludes with some reflections on the value and implications 
of an enlightened sovereign for Kant's political philosophy and the inadequacy of 
mechanical and legalistic readings of his project of Perpetual Peace in light of the 
use of the secret article. 
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Chapter One 
The Groundwork for Preferable Peace 
The second edition of Kant's Perpetual Peace featured the addition of a secret 
article. This addendum presents some serious and troubling challenges for the 
coherence of the text. Kant himself acknowledges that it is an objective 
contradiction to negotiations of public right (Peace 337). It is the goal of this 
thesis to criticize Kant's defense of the secret article and examine the articles 
meaning in the broader context of his project of enlightenment. The purpose of 
this initial chapter is to introduce Toward Perpetual Peace to the new reader by 
highlighting the moments in the text that are crucial for analyzing and 
understanding the secret article. It also puts forward the argument that there is 
symmetry between the desire for peace and prohibitions on secrets. 
This chapter is subdivided into two sections. The first section 
accomplishes two tasks. First it demonstrates the foundational importance of 
trust for Kant's analysis of international relations and peace. Second, the section 
demonstrates the theoretical relationships that exist between trust and secrets. 
After establishing the theoretical foundations of the discussion in the first 
section the chapter then progresses to address a challenge of a more practical 
nature. The second section tackles the question as to why a nation ought to 
prefer peace to war. This is a particularly prescient question given that Kant 
agrees with realist1 accounts of international relations which argue that nations 
naturally find themselves in a state of unfettered competition and war. The 
unnaturalness of peace is the subject of the second section. 
1.1 Foundational Trust 
Trust is fundamental to commodious living. Communities require that 
participants behave in regular and intelligible ways but there are many ways in 
which this trust may be established. Trust can be established explicitly by 
agreement such as contracts. For example, a constitution is the guarantor of trust 
in a republic. However, trust does not have to be explicitly established, it may be 
implicit. While contracts are bilateral stipulations of duties, some duties may be 
unilateral and need not be stipulated. The duties incumbent on the aristocracy 
under Noblesse Oblige, for example, did not have to be established in 
consultation with the serfs. In addition to the explicit bilateral and implicit 
unilateral establishment of intelligibility and regularity, trust may also come about 
without any stipulation and intention.2 In the Parts Five and Six of Book Two of 
1 Realist and idealist interpretations represent the governing dichotomy of international relations theory. 
Realists often cite Thomas Hobbes' political philosophy to support their claims that nations are by nature 
hostile and that war is the natural condition. Idealists, on the other hand, have traditionally used Kant to 
support their claims that interactions between nations are more accurately described as harmonious, rather, 
than antagonistic. They often cite such phenomena as the fact that democracies are unlikely to attack one 
another and attempt to theorize such empirical phenomena with appeals to Kant's first definitive article for 
perpetual peace which calls for all nations to adopt a republican constitution. Whether or not democracies 
meet the conditions set out for a republic by the article are rarely discussed. 
2 In his essay, entitled Trust and Civil Society, Asam B. Seligman cites interest groups, civil society, and 
social movements as examples of trust relationships that exist "beyond the state" (12). Seligman's concept 
of beyond the state is interesting to note because the structures and organizations he cites, while possibly 
having international and cosmopolitan components, exist within state borders. Although there is an 
international social movement for environmental protection, for example, the Rennies River Development 
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the Politics, Aristotle argues that a diamond shaped social structure with a large 
middle class is preferable for social stability. He reasoned that this arrangement 
would ensure the greatest degree of stability because the interests of the state 
and the interests of its citizens would be in harmony since a large majority of the 
population would be personally invested in the welfare of the nation. The citizens 
could take solace in the implicit trust that exists between their self-interests and 
state interests. 
The development of an international community is also premised on a 
foundation of trust. International peace requires that nations be able to trust one 
another. Secrets erode trust and are therefore caustic to peace. Immanuel Kant 
sought to neutralize this corrosive effect of secrecy in Toward Perpetual Peace. 
The treatise is an alkaline; as a method for reducing the risk surrounding 
international negotiations and thus increasing the trust between nations it 
prohibits national secrets. Toward Perpetual Peace is organized in two sections 
and an appendix. The first section contains six preliminary articles for perpetual 
peace among states. The second section contains three definitive articles and 
two supplemental articles for perpetual peace and the appendix is divided into 
two subsections dealing with the disagreement and agreement of morals with 
politics. 
Foundation which protects a St. John's river is locally situated. The concept of beyond the state that can 
include local activity is more correctly described as being beyond the obligations set out by the constitution 
of the state and this is a concept employed throughout this thesis. 
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The preliminary articles for perpetual peace are designed to encourage 
peace by limiting and reducing the amount of risk states must endure during 
international dealings. The preliminary articles examine the rights and laws that 
should govern international relations (Franke 29).3 These six prohibitions have 
the status of law, according to the definition of a law as a universal and 
necessary maxim. The preliminary articles for perpetual peace apply equally to 
all nations regardless of size or power. For example, small nations cannot use 
assassins to defend against larger nations. The following section outlines the 
three strict prohibitions that nations must impose upon themselves so that they 
may enter into a peaceful league of nations, the fodus pacificum (Peace 327). 
The first prohibitive article states that "no treaty of peace shall be held to 
be such if it is made with a secret reservation of material for a future war" (Peace 
317). The second prohibition states that "no independently existing state 
(whether small or large) shall be acquired by another state through inheritance, 
exchange, purchase or donation" (Peace 318). The third article states that 
3 Even though all six articles are prohibitive laws, rationally universal and necessary, they can be sorted 
into two groups on the basis of the temporal immediacy of their application. Some of the articles must be 
adopted immediately, and without such immediate adoption, no further headway could be made toward 
peace. (Peace 327). These are articles of leges strictae. The adoption of other articles can be postponed 
without fundamentally jeopardizing lasting peace, but given that they are laws, and as such are necessary, 
the adoption of these articles cannot be postponed indefinitely. These are articles of leges latae. 
As Danile Brezaeale notes, leges latae are a "limiting factor" on prohibitive laws (Pious Wish 
946). The rights ensured by these postponed articles are analogous to a right to exercise stock options in a 
stock market. Having an option on a stock does not mean that you need to buy a stock today in order to 
have the right to purchase it at present day prices; rather, the option entitles the holder to the right to pay 
present day prices at some specified future date. The right to the present day price is not given up by not 
purchasing today; it is rather, postponed to a future date. Likewise, the rights ensured by some articles 
need not be exercised immediately but neither are they given up. Kant is careful to note that laws, whose 
duty need not be fulfilled immediately, are not a separate species of law from prohibitive laws; rather, they 
are special cases where permission can be granted regarding the fulfillment of the duty. 3 Articles two, 
three, and four are such special cases. The duty to articles one, five, and six, however, must be fulfilled 
immediately. 
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"standing armies (miles perpetuus) shall in time be abolished altogether" (Peace 
318-19). The fourth prohibitive article states that "no national debt shall be 
contracted with regard to external affairs to a state" (Peace 318-19). The fifth 
prohibition states that "no state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and 
government of another state" (Peace 318-19). The sixth and final article 
necessary for perpetual peace states that "no state at war with another shall 
allow itself such acts of hostility as would have to make mutual trust impossible 
during a future peace; acts of this kind are employing assassins (percussores) or 
poisoners (venefict), breach of surrender, incitement to treason (perduel/io) within 
the enemy state, and so forth" (Peace 320). 
The three strict laws must be obeyed immediately and they are 
prohibitions on the actions and behavior of states (Peace 327). To help make the 
lawful structure of the articles more explicit, I will accompany each with the 
imperative, ought (or ought not, since they are prohibitive laws), formulation. The 
first article states, "No treaty of peace shall be held to be such if it is made with a 
secret reservation of material for a future war" (Peace 317). In the imperative 
form it prescribes that peace treaties ought not to be entered into in bad faith. 
This is a necessary precondition for peace because if parties in negotiations 
were consciously and actively looking to find and create loopholes through which 
to escape the obligations that negotiation places upon them they would surely 
find some, since no document or contract is immune to self-interested 
interpretation, or as Kant so eloquently puts it "Jesuitical casuistry" (Peace 318). 
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With a loophole firmly in hand, one party would be free to wage war on another, 
thus turning the peace treaty into a "mere truce, a suspension of hostilities," or a 
cease fire, that would only last until a time when the particulars of the loophole 
are made manifest empirically (Peace 317). This, as Kant rightly notes, is not 
peace. Peace by definition is perpetual. It is not the suspension of a war. It is, 
rather, the suspension of warfare. In his explanation of the first article Kant 
makes a clear distinction between peace and "a mere truce" (Peace 317). A 
truce is a suspension of hostilities, whereas, peace is the end of all hostilities 
(Peace 317). Remarking on redundancy in the title of his work, Kant notes that 
the universal conclusion of hostility denoted by peace makes the addition of the 
adjective perpetual a "suspicious pleonasm" (Peace 317). Duty to the first article 
requires immediate action on behalf of the nations involved in treaty making 
because, without immediate acquiescence to the article, the treaty would be 
worthless. If bargaining parties withheld their consent to a treaty until a time at 
which they could find a way out of its terms, or bargained in bad faith while 
negotiating the treaty, there would be no grounds for the trust necessary for 
entering into treaties. In the case of postponement the disadvantaged party 
would never willingly acquiesce to terms and conditions that were not binding 
upon the abstaining party. Likewise, in the case of bad faith, negotiations would 
end immediately because there would not be the slightest inkling of trust upon 
which to move forward. 
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The fifth article is also an immediate prohibition on the actions a nation 
may undertake when dealing with another state. The article states, "No state 
shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and government of another state" 
(Peace 319). The imperative formulation is as follows: states ought not forcibly to 
interfere with the governance of each other. This seems to be a strange 
prohibition for perpetual peace because forcible interference in the affairs of 
another country would quite obviously constitute an act of war. The formulation 
has the appearance of a tautology: do not make acts of war if you do not want 
war. What Kant is considering here, however, is not so obvious. As Van Der 
Linden states in his essay on the duty to promote peace, "Kant suggests that just 
as one may not coercively interfere with the immoral conduct of a person who 
sets a bad example, so it is wrong to coercively interfere with a foreign state that 
does not harm other states but oppresses its own people' (Political Intervention 
72). The prohibition on interference with the governance of another nation is a 
prohibition on military intervention in the affairs of struggling nations. It is a 
prohibition on states making less fortunate nations military protectorates. There 
is, however, one exception to this imperative that occurs when a struggling nation 
collapses into civil war. It is not in violation to intercede in this case because a 
region that is experiencing civil war is not a nation and, thus, cannot have its 
rights violated. 
In the last half of the twentieth century both super powers provided 
examples of this situation. Both the former Soviet Union and the USA intervened 
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in the rule of foreign nations in countries such as Afghanistan and Viet Nam, and 
these cases seem to be clear examples of violations of the imperative. Kant 
claims that civil unrest is not sufficient grounds for intervention (Peace 320). But 
even when the interventionist armies claim that civil order has fully eroded and 
the nation has collapsed, the rulers of the collapsed, or collapsing, states, at 
times, deny that they are in a state of civil war. In the 1990's the ruling forces in 
Somalia argued that UN and US forces had no business in the country because 
their problems were internal matters not subject to international concern. 
Even though there is a quasi-exception to the fifth article and its implementation 
is easily disputed, it is, nevertheless, an immediately necessary prohibition on 
national action. The prohibition is immediately necessary because to intervene in 
the governance of another nation, if only for a short period of time, would still be 
an act of war. It is an immediate and necessary prohibition on the actions of a 
nation based on the need for trust between nations. 
The first article stresses the need for trust in negotiations, whereas the 
sixth article stresses need for trust during times of war and it stipulates: "no state 
at war with another shall allow itself such acts of hostility as would have to make 
mutual trust impossible during a future peace; acts of this kind are employing 
assassins (percussores) or poisoners (venefict), breach of surrender, incitement 
to treason (perduellio) within the enemy state, and so forth" (Peace 320). A more 
concise imperative formulation would be that warring nations ought not to 
undermine the trust that adversaries have in their rationality. As Kant writes, 
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"some trust in the enemy's way of thinking must still remain in the midst or war" 
(Peace 320). The use of dishonest stratagems, including but not limited to, such 
acts as "employing assassins (percussores) or poisoners (venefict), breach of 
surrender, incitement to treason (perduellio) within the enemy state," violates just 
actions because they overstep the right of a nation to simply defend itself, and 
thus violate reason itself (Peace 320). Without trust in the rationality of the other, 
there would be no foundation for any sort of trust whatsoever. Furthermore, the 
use of dishonorable stratagems would be so tempting to a nation, that they would 
eventually be employed in times of peace as well as war, thus eroding the border 
between the two, creating a state of perpetual war (Peace 320). Hence, the 
prohibition on the activities, which today are commonly called special warfare 
and tactics, must be obeyed necessarily and immediately. 
Other than the immediacy and trust of the obligation imposed, the 
common factor between the three strict laws is that each one is a prohibition on 
the behavior, or course of action, that a state may take. If nations were to 
disobey these laws, their actions would not conform to reason. The first and sixth 
articles are imperatives to act in a trustworthy manner and the fifth article is a 
prohibition against the act of war itself. 
The logic of Kant's position on secrets is clear and coherent.4 There is a 
negative correlation between risk and trust. Trust is directly proportional to the 
4 It is not my intention at this point to discuss Kant's specific prohibition on secrets. Rather, in this chapter 
I am examining the logical challenges secrets present to peaceful international relations. Kant's specific 
prohibition is discussed in the next chapter. 
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level of potential threat and by extension there is a negative correlation between 
secrecy and trust. If the level of secrecy increases between nations, then the 
level of trust decreases. In extreme situations the level of trust may fall so low 
that the relationship between two nations erodes into war. Kant's analysis of 
employing assassins illustrates his logic of risk reduction and trust formation 
(Peace 320). Spies are a secret weapon. They increase the threat a nation poses 
and there is a positive correlation between secrecy and potential threat. This 
secret weapon increases the risk a nation must incur when dealing with another 
nation which employs assassins and consequently the difficulty of trusting a 
nation that employs assassins is increased. Prohibiting secrets is in line with the 
general strategy of Toward Perpetual Peace, which is, to build peace by reducing 
risk. 
Given the logical consistency of Kant's general strategy and the specific 
measures outlined in the "preliminary articles" the second5 "supplemental article" 
is a contradiction. Kant entitles the second supplemental article for perpetual 
5 I omit a discussion of the definitive articles and the first supplemental article at this point in order to draw 
special attention to the problem of secrets for Kant's strategy of increasing peace by decreasing risk. The 
preliminary articles are illustrations of the legalistic quality of the "objective" contradiction presented by 
the secret article. On the other hand, the first supplemental article and the second definitive article are 
concerned with the actualization of peace. The first supplemental article contains the famous "nation of 
devils" argument, which asserts that with nature as the guarantor of peace even a nation of devils could 
achieve harmonious coexistence. Whereas the first supplemental article lends natural assurance to the 
realization of peace, the second definitive article has a more tactical and programmatic flavor. It 
recommends that peace requires the arrangement of nation states with republican constitutions, as 
prescribed by the first definitive article, into afodus pacificum, or a league of nations organized into a 
federation. Kant's federalism is designed as a buffer or mediating aggregation between the need for the 
sovereign autonomy of individual nations, as required by the original contract between a sovereign and his 
citizens, and the demands for nondestructive relationships between nations. In the subsequent section of 
my text, entitled Unnatural Peace, I employ the first supplemental article to support my reading of the 
second definitive article. 
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peace "The Secret Article for Perpetual Peace." The content of the secret article 
allows the sovereign to benefit from the counsel of an educated citizenry without 
acknowledging their influence and thus, in effect, he receives counsel in secret. 
He openly acknowledges the challenge this supplement presents to his textual 
strategy. He writes that, "a secret article in negotiations of public right is 
objectively, that is, considered in terms of its content, a contradiction" (Peace 
337). Kant clearly defines what he means by public right in the second 
subsection of the appendix. The public character of a right is of key importance 
for his definition. Kant reasons that if he were to 
abstract for all matter of public right as teachers of right 
usually think of it (from the various empirically given relations 
of individuals within a state or also of states to one another), 
[he is] still left with the form of publicity, the possibility of 
which is involved in every claim to a right, since without it 
there would be no justice (which can be thought only as 
publicly known) and so too no right, which is conferred only 
by justice (Peace 347). 
Kant rejects the empiricist argument for natural rights. Rights result from justice 
and justice requires public assertion. Justice and publicity are linked because 
public discourse is the laboratory of reason, as expressed in the statement that 
"every claim to a right must have [the] capacity for publicity" (Peace 347). Kant 
continues by arguing that, 
since one can very easily appraise whether it is present in a 
case at hand - that is whether or not publicity is consistent 
with an agent's principles - it can yield a criterion to be found 
a priori in reason that is very easy to use; in cases where 
they are inconsistent we can recognize at once, as if by an 
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experiment of pure reason, the falsity (illegitimacy) of the 
claim in question (praetensio inuris). 
After abstracting in this way from everything empirical 
that the concept of the right of a state or the right of nations 
contains (such as the malevolence of human nature, which 
make coercion necessary), one can call the following 
proposition the transcendental formula of public right. 
'All actions relating to the right of others are wrong if 
their maxim is incompatible with publicity' (Peace 347). 
The transcendental formula proposes that actions which are in accordance with 
the a priori principle of justice, that is, just actions that can be applied necessarily 
and universally as law, must be able to withstand public scrutiny. Actions which 
cannot withstand public debate and scrutiny do not meet the sufficient conditions 
for being lawful. When Kant states that a secret article is objectively a 
contradiction he is making the claim that it cannot meet the criterion for a lawful 
action. Thus the secret article objectively contradicts the general strategy of risk 
reduction and trust building established by the lawful preliminary articles. 
Kant attempts to justify or at least defend the secret article by arguing that 
while it is objectively unjustified it is subjectively legitimate. He argues that a 
secret article in negotiations of public right is "subjectively, appraised in terms of 
the quality of the person who dictates it, a secret can well be present in them, in 
as much as a person finds it prejudicial to his dignity to announce publicly that he 
is its author" (Peace 337). Unlike the preliminary and definitive articles the secret 
is not instantiated as part of the legal institutions. Kant notes that the secret 
article "requires no special arrangement of states" (Peace 337). It is not 
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objective; rather the secret is internalized and the contradiction is concealed 
within the agent. The secret is tacitly assumed. As Kant notes, "a state will 
therefore invite [philosophers} instruction tacitly (thus making a secret of it)" 
(Peace 337). The state does not and cannot explicitly ask for secret consultation. 
It must, as he says, "allow [philosophers] to speak freely and publicly" and the 
state must passively listen to this public discourse, thus receive instruction tacitly 
(Peace 337). Kant's appeal to the 'tacit' is an attempt to avoid the systemic 
contradictions of the secret article by shifting the article from the objective legal 
realm occupied by the preliminary articles into the subjective realm of dignity thus 
making it a debate about the moral character of the sovereign. The 'tacit' avoids 
the requirements of contractual obligations and political practice. Thus when 
Kant uses the term 'tacit' he is signaling the subjective and the moral as opposed 
to the legal and the political, and this is the way in which the term is used in this 
thesis.6 
This is a subtle piece of argumentation and before analyzing the validity of 
this argumentative strategy and any challenges it may present to international 
peace it is necessary to address the question as to why a nation would prefer 
peace in the first place. 
6 Chapter three examines the tacit character of the secret article in light of the private and public uses of 
reason Kant developed in What is Enlightenment?. This analysis reveals that the tacit structure is devised 
to accommodate the free public use of reason. The analysis demonstrates that the public use of reason goes 
beyond the explicit dictums given by the requirements of contractual obligations and thus the free 
expression of public debate falls under the tacit protection of the secret article. 
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1.2 Unnatural Peace 
Up to this point I have written as if nations start out in a state of peaceful 
coexistence and degenerate into a state of war when trust is eroded by 
international secrecy. This question is particularly important because peace is not 
the natural condition of nation states. If peace is unnatural it is not unreasonable 
to ask why a nation should expend it efforts and resources and move from a 
condition of war to one of peace. This is all the more pertinent a question for 
nations that are thriving in the natural condition of unfettered competition. 
Although Kant in the sixth preliminary article comments that punitive war is 
unthinkable, there is no need to believe that this was or will always be the case? 
Kant's theories of right and justice are based on the public use of reason 
and although he rejected natural right theory and strongly opposed its leading 
proponents, such as, Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf and Emmerich de Vattel, 
he nevertheless agrees with these theorists in respect to the original condition of 
humanity (Peace 326). Like those natural right theorists and the contemporary 
realist school of international relations, Kant by and large supports the claim that 
both individuals and nations naturally find themselves in a state of war. Franke 
characterizes Kant's support for this claim as follows, 
7 To update this example, one might think of the recent cold war in the same way as MAD, or mutually 
assured destruction, theorists. The MAD theory argued that the former Soviet Union and the USA were in 
a nuclear stalemate and that the arms race ensured global stability. The tension surrounding the Cuban 
Missile Crisis and the rejection of star wars orbital weapon systems by the Regan administration are 
examples ofthe logic behind this theory. However, punitive war is only unthinkable when there is a 
relative balance of power. The empires of Alexander the Great and Genghis Khan were not restricted by 
strong competition. Similarly recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq suggest that punitive war is not at all 
unthinkable in a geopolitics that contains only one super power. Thus there is a demand for a persuasive 
argument for peace. 
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while not fully supporting the notion that humans are naturally and 
eternally in a state of war with one another, Kant does appear to 
admit to a natural plan in the human environment that foretells 
precise limits to what they, as a species, may set their hopes. If one 
downplays the final emphasis on the presumably good ends, Kant 
seems here to imbue the movement of humanity only with what a 
natural state permits, regardless of what individuals may will (70). 
Given the natural condition, Kant reasons that peace is unnatural and must be 
brought about. Kant states that unlike peace "war itself, however, needs, no 
special motive but seems to be engraphed onto human nature" (Peace 334). 
International relationships in their nascence are relationships of force yet there is 
no right to war (Peace 328). However, military victory does not provide a 
justification for a nation's right to sovereignty. Kant stipulates that "right cannot 
be decided by war and its favorable outcome, victor/' (Peace 327). Rights are 
given their legitimacy by justice and reason and they require public recognition, 
rather than a private show of force. 
The public assignation of rights is illustrated by the idea of "original 
possession" developed in the discussion of private property in The Metaphysics 
of Morals. Original possession is the term Kant uses to describe the process of 
procuring property in the state of nature (Metaphysics of Morals 414-15). 
Individual ownership requires a community that will recognize that a given piece 
of property belongs to a particular person. Kant states, "Original possession in 
common, is rather, a practical rational concept which contains a priori the 
principle in accordance with which alone people can use a place on the earth in 
accordance with principles of right" (Metaphysics of Morals 414). Without 
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community consent and assignation a person cannot have a right to a piece of 
property. 
In a state of natural competition any person has as much claim as another 
to an object. When all are against all, to borrow Hobbes' now famous formulation, 
all are equally free to everything. There are no natural rights, rather as Kant 
claims; an individual acts as though he possesses the property in anticipation of 
the formation of a community that will confer his right to the property in question. 
He states, "the condition in which the will of all is actually united for giving law is 
the civil condition (conditio sin qua non); for a unilateral will cannot put others 
under an obligation they would not otherwise have" (Metaphysics of Morals 416). 
Thus, Kant questions the use of the word "right" to describe a nation's 
prerogative in the state of nature. He muses that "it is surprising that the word 
right could still not altogether be banished as pedantic from the politics of war" 
(Peace 326). Thus, although nations are free to make war they do not properly 
have the right to do so in the state of nature. 
The process of developing international peace is not a threat to a nation's 
rights, as the natural right theorists, who hold that any bilateral measures 
necessarily eliminate the free unilaterally directed activities of a state, would 
argue; but rather, it requires that they limit their freedom. As Kant articulates it, 
In accordance with reason there is only one way that 
states in relation with one another can leave the 
lawless condition, which involves nothing but war; it is 
that, like individual human beings, they give up their 
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savage (lawless) freedom, accommodate themselves 
to public coercive laws (Peace 328). 
Even though nations, like individuals, find themselves in a state of natural 
competition, unlike individuals, they are not compelled to leave the state of 
nature. Even though, "what holds in accordance with natural right for human 
beings in a lawless condition, 'they ought to leave this condition,' cannot hold for 
states in accordance with the rights of nations" (Peace 327). He addresses two 
reasons why the imperative to leave the state of war is not immediately 
applicable to nation states. First, nations, unlike the individuals who comprise 
them, have a rightful constitution. Kant's theory of the rightful constitution is 
based on his republicanism. The nations to which he refers are formed on the 
grounds of reasonable and just constitutions that can withstand public scrutiny. 
Kant identifies the republic with the just state because a republican constitution is 
established, 
first on principles of the freedom of the members of a society (as 
individuals), second on the principles of dependence of all upon a 
single common legislation (as subjects), and third on the laws of 
equality (as citizens of a state) on which all rightful legislation of a 
people must be based ... The republican constitution is thus, as far 
as right is concerned, in itself that which every kind of civil 
constitution has as its original basis; the question now is only 
whether it is also the sole constitution that can lead toward 
perpetual peace (Peace 322). 
Kant definitively answers this question. The First Definitive Article states 
that a rightful republican constitution is necessary for peace. However, he is also 
careful to note in the Second Definitive Article that republicanism is antithetical to 
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a unitary global government because It prevents nations from fully 
accommodating themselves to public coercive laws, as an individual does within 
a state, because for nations to accommodate themselves in this way would 
violate the "original contract" between a citizenry and its sovereign thus in effect 
dissolving the nation (Common 296; Peace 328). 
Although he does not mention the original contract by name in What is 
Enlightenment Kant uses the Latin phrase "Caesar non est super gram maticos" 
to express the idea (Enlightenment 20). The literal translation is, "Caesar is not 
above the grammarians." Kant uses the phrase to convey the idea of the rule of 
law (Enlightenment 20). Under the rule of law not even the sovereign, as author 
of the Ia~. is above the law. Kant states, 
but what a people may never decide upon for itself, a monarch may 
still less decide upon for a people; for his legislative authority rests 
precisely on this, that he unites in his will the collective will of the 
people (Enlightenment 20). 
Like Rousseau's concept to the general will, Kant's original contract 
grounds the legislative authority of the sovereign in the will of the people. 
According to Kant's theory a sovereign could never rightfully impose a law that a 
citizenry could not rationally consent to. Reason is the limit of political power for 
Kant. An enlightened nation, like an enlightened citizen, acts in accordance with 
reason. The grammarians are none other than the universal and necessary laws 
of reason. Reason is the foundation for the legitimate unification of the rule of the 
sovereign and the general will, thus a constitution which is binding is drafted in 
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accordance with, and upon, rational principles. Kant concludes that a republican 
constitution meets the condition for a binding contract between citizens and their 
sovereign. 
Kant explains the reticence of sovereign nations to leave the state of 
nature as follows "they have a rightful constitution internally and hence have 
outgrown the constraint of others to bring them under a more extended law-
governed constitution in accordance with their concepts of right" (Peace 327). 
This first reason why the imperative to leave the state of war does not apply to 
states is based in the logical incoherence of a republic violating its constitution by 
placing itself under the rule of another body. This reason illustrates the strength 
of the savage freedom of original possession. A republic has declared its 
intention to be a sovereign nation and it violates its freedom to do so by 
surrendering its self-rule to a third party. A republican constitution satisfies the 
one sided liberty of the original position but falls short of the public 
acknowledgement of the claim to self-rule by other nations and thus falls short of 
a rightful claim. 
The second reason why nation states are reluctant to enter into peaceful 
relations does not have the logical clout of Kant's republican argument; rather, it 
is based on the empirical consideration that war is intimately associated with 
nationalism and noble pride. Although natural competition is terrifying for 
individuals, it is a source of pride for nations. Natural competition is the source of 
militaristic nationalism, which is valorized across nations as military courage 
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when found in individuals (Peace 334). Such is the character of the warrior prince 
and the noble savage. 
Thus warfare is the only way for a nation to exercise and defend its so-
called rights because nations are in a lawless condition of all against all (Peace 
320). Therefore, peace is unnatural and must be established; however, it is not 
immediately clear that a sovereign would prefer to trade his freedom for rights 
and peace. The move toward perpetual peace curtails a nation's freedom and is 
contrary to the warmongering Kant believes to be so natural a part of the human 
character. Kant, like his predecessor Thomas Hobbes, believes that the natural 
condition is a state of war and that peace has to be built out of this situation. In 
order to make the case for bringing about this transformation Kant must present 
an argument for preferring peace. In fact there are three arguments for preferring 
peace running throughout Toward Perpetual Peace. Kant provides, what I will 
call, an empirical argument for peace, a legal argument for peace and, finally, a 
moral argument for peace. An understanding of these three arguments is 
integral to the proper assessment of his subjective defense of the secret article. 
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Chapter Two 
Preferable Peace and the Secret Article 
2.1 Preferable Peace 
The arguments for why nations and sovereigns ought to prefer peace to war are 
the same as the arguments for why they ought not to keep secrets. Secrets 
increase the level of risk and are thus contrary to peace; hence any argument for 
peace is an argument against secrets and vice versa. Thus the deleterious 
effects of secrets on the empirical, legal, and moral integrity of the state can be 
used to illustrate that peace is preferable to war. Kant attempts to defend the 
secret article by making a distinction between the objective and subjective 
contradiction it presents. 8 This distinction is based on the conditions required for 
perpetual peace. There are empirical, legal, and moral conditions. Nations must 
survive, have a rightful claim to their sovereignty as acknowledged by other 
8 The defense of the article is based in Kant's theory of objective and subjective conditions and principles 
for action. Kant defines the subjective principles that affect one's actions and maxims, and they 
must be distinguished from the objective principle, namely the practical law. The former 
contains the practical rule determined by reason in conformity with the conditions of the 
subject (often ignorance or also his inclinations), and is therefore the principle in 
accordance with which the subject acts; but the law is the objective principle valid for 
every rational being, and the principle in accordance with which he ought to act, i.e., an 
imperative" (Groundwork 73). 
Thus, Kant asserts that the secret article is not a contradiction when considered in terms of the sovereign's 
subjective inclinations. 
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nations, and finally peace requires the progress of humanity as guaranteed by 
nature. These are the reasons Kant presents as the benefits of peace.9 
The first two reasons fall under the objective conditions. Peace will 
ensure the survival and legal recognition of national sovereignty. Secrets 
objectively contradict the success of these two conditions. The preliminary 
articles address the empirical value of trust. They are designed to increase the 
level of trust by creating a balance of power among nations. The definitive article 
for a federation of republics and the transcendental concept of public right ensure 
the legal legitimacy of national sovereignty. The moral integrity of the state on the 
other hand falls under the subjective condition. 
In addition to securing its empirical survivability and its right to self rule a 
nation must also secure its moral integrity. Perpetual peace demands this 
subjective requirement and thus it is questionable if Kant's strategy of shunting 
the secret article to the subjective side of the equation will satisfy its justification. 
The following sections examine the three reasons for preferring peace and the 
legitimacy of Kant's subjective defense of the secret article for perpetual peace. 
International peace is based on the ability of one nation to trust another. 
Secrets are anathema to perpetuating trust and therefore peace. Kant argues 
9 The first ofthe three reasons is based on the "peace of the graveyard." I have dubbed this the empirical 
reason. The preliminary articles are primarily concerned with addressing the empirical challenges to peace. 
The second reason is based on the rightful recognition of national sovereignty. Given that this reason is 
pertaining to rights I have called it the legal reason. The question of national sovereignty and peace is 
addressed most thoroughly by the definitive articles, as well as, the second section of the appendix. 
Finally, the third reason is based on the moral development and enlightenment of humanity and thus I have 
called it the moral reason. This reason is addressed by the supplemental articles and the first subsection of 
the appendix. 
22 
that nations should not keep any state secrets if they desire peace. Nations 
should prefer peace to war because it is through peace that they can have a right 
to national sovereignty, for there are no rightful claims in a state of war. Fichte, 
commenting on Perpetual Peace, expresses the relationship between peace and 
rights as follows, "as soon as the majority of men begin to care more about the 
secure preservation of what they have than about the uncertain acquisition of 
what others possess, then will a constitution in accordance with right and reason 
be established" (320). The prohibition against secrets is a clear and logical 
position for Kant to uphold. Unfortunately for his readers, he also upholds that the 
legislative authority of a state should be permitted to keep a secret. The 
legislative authority should secretly consult philosophers on matters of 
international relations; furthermore, this secret will facilitate the movement 
towards perpetual peace. 
Given the grave danger secrets pose to international peace Kant's 
justification for allowing this one secret must be an extraordinary exception to the 
rule. Kant argues that to consult openly the opinions of philosophers would be 
humiliating to the sovereign's wisdom and thus must be done in secret in order 
not be prejudicial to the sovereign's dignity. This chapter argues that Kant's 
explicit defense of a secret article for perpetual peace is insufficient to justify the 
secret. His comments on dignity, wisdom, humiliation, and self-conceit do not 
support his claim that it is legitimate for the sovereign to keep secrets based on 
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the argument that the subjective appraisal of the public announcement of his 
intentions would be prejudicial to his dignity and humiliating to his wisdom. 
Dignity is derived from fulfilling one's duty to the moral law. Thus, how can 
violating the moral law by keeping secrets contribute to the sovereign's dignity? 
The incompleteness of any one person's wisdom is not a source of shame since 
Kant claims that wisdom is always incomplete for human beings. Thus, a 
personal claim to be perfectly wise is an un-virtuous act of self-conceit and does 
not justify the risk of secrecy. Furthermore, the purpose of humiliation is to 
correct the vice of self-conceit. Thus the vice of the sovereign, i.e., conceited 
wisdom, cannot be reason enough to support the concealment of that vice. 
Reasoning of this type is the amoral logic of the free rider, i.e., someone who 
attempts to gain an advantage because their actions cannot be universalized. 
The free rider's actions do not meet the moral burden of an enlightened world 
order working towards perpetual peace. The logic of the free rider is not the logic 
of a dignified head of state. 
2.2 Empirical Arguments for Preferring Peace and Avoiding Secrets 
Empirically peace is preferable to war because the conclusion of any 
natural competition, including the competition that exists among nations, is the 
"peace of the graveyard" (Peace 328). The preliminary articles for perpetual 
peace are a blueprint for ending international war predicated on bringing the 
military might of all nations into balance. The preliminary articles are a 
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combination of immediate, or strict, and mediated, or permissive restrictions 
nations must place on their behavior and property. 
The preliminary articles are proposals for establishing military equity 
through a gradual process of repatriation, disarmament and an immediate 
concession to lasting peace treaties. Repatriation coupled with prohibitions on 
military intervention will undo and further prevent the unjust expansion of empires 
through conquest. These acts of expansionism are unjust because they violate 
the original contract between the citizens of nations and their sovereigns. 
Disarmament will alleviate the threat of hostilities through the menace of standing 
armies. Nations are equal in their right to self-governance even if they are 
unequal in size and military strength. Treaties will be lasting, Kant argues, 
because they will be entered into without secret reservations to evade the 
binding terms of the treaty at some future date (Peace 317). 
Honesty is the foundation of the empirical military equity. Secrets threaten 
an equitable balance of power because they are weapons against the trust that is 
necessary to build an enlightened world order. Unlike standing armies and 
colonies, secret motives, like national treasures, foreign loans,10 spies, 
assassins, poisoners, snipers and counter intelligence agents, can be stockpiled 
10 Kant's position on economic inequity is unclear. He states that nations' fortunes are a threat to 
international security because they can be amassed in secret but he does not stipulate whether it is the 
economic inequity or the potential secrecy of economic power that is at the root of the dilemma. He 
prescribes neither financial transparency nor any form of international transfer payment. His comments on 
cosmopolitanism seem to suggest that he envisioned an enlightened world order as including international 
free trade and perhaps he sees some solution to the problem of national economic inequity in this. 
However, Kant's exact thoughts on international finance are beyond the scope of this paper. For further 
discussion of the role economic factors in Perpetual Peace see Allen Wood's essay, Kant's Project for 
Perpetual Peace. 
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out of sight and thus can disrupt the balance of power while maintaining the 
appearance of peace. 
These stockpiles may be the greatest threat to international peace 
precisely because they are secret and the temptation to use them is so great that 
without their explicit prohibition they would serve to erode the very boundaries of 
peace and war, thus sending nations into a state of perpetual war. Although 
snipers were not included in the original prohibition on secret warfare in Toward 
Perpetual Peace, Kant identifies their sinister power to "lie in wait to ambush" and 
exploit an opponent's lack of preparedness, when he revisits the issue in The 
Metaphysics of Morals (485). Snipers are emblematic of the false promises that 
undermine peace treaties for theirs is the power to ambush; to tip the balance of 
power through the clandestine postponement of nefarious activity. This is also 
the sinister power of keeping state secrets. 
Standing armies are a threat to international peace because they provide 
the opportunity to take advantage of the inequity resulting from an opponent's 
under-preparedness. Secrets are doubly dangerous because not only do they 
take advantage of the inequity resulting from an opponent's lack of 
preparedness, they also create the inequity by unbalancing the economy of truth. 
Although the size of standing armies may represent an imbalance in the military 
power of two nations, they do not create an inequity. A secret on the other hand 
is the cause of an imbalance in power. Furthermore, any rational actor faced 
with an adversary who they suspect of making false promises would attempt to 
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restore a balance of power by making a false promise themselves. This is the 
logic of the free rider. When a rational agent suspects another person of not 
acting in the interest of the general good that rational agent will conclude that 
becoming a free rider himself is the only reasonable option. If one nation free 
rides on the truthfulness of others it would not take long before the other nations 
would follow suit. 
Secrets are contrary to the moral criteria for universality of actions set out 
by the categorical imperative. Kant distinguishes categorical imperatives from 
other principles for action as follows, 
There is one imperative that, without being based upon and having 
as its condition any other purpose to be attained by certain conduct, 
commands this conduct immediately. This imperative is 
categorical. It has to do not with the matter of the action and what 
is to result from it, but with the form and the principle from which the 
action itself follows; and the essentially good action consists in the 
disposition, let the result be what it may. This imperative may be 
called the imperative of morality (Groundwork 69). 
Free riders are the true villains of the Kantian moral universe. The logic of their 
actions is predicated on the fact that their actions will not be universalized. It is 
by wagering on other people not following their lead that they attempt to gain 
their unfair advantage. After all, how often do plotters of secret plans wish 
themselves to be plotted against? It is precisely this question which leads Kant 
to conclude that provisions for political revolutions cannot be legislated (Peace 
348). Who would legislate their own undoing? Thus, revolutions must be 
conspired in secret. 
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2.3 Legal Arguments for Preferring Peace and Avoiding Secrets 
The indefensibility of legislating revolution and the accompanying 
necessary concealment of revolutionary activity is an example Kant uses to 
illustrate the inductive empirical prohibition on secrets that is an adjunct to the 
deductive categorical imperative. The rationally deduced universality of actions 
necessitated by the categorical imperative is the positive formulation of moral 
action. The prohibition on secrets, as Kant acknowledges, is a negative 
formulation. It does not have the logical certainty like that of the ability of truths 
to be expressed publicly; rather, it has the possibility that an action or plan 
contrived in secret is unlikely to withstand public scrutiny. 
The reason for the inability of many secrets to withstand public scrutiny is 
because they conceal the self-interested ambitions of free riders. Nation's do not 
have a right to keep secrets. "Every claim to a right," Kant stipulates, "must have 
[the) capacity for publicity" (Peace 347). He goes on to strengthen this claim as 
the transcendental concept of public right, which states that, "all actions relating 
to the rights of others are wrong if their maxim is incompatible with publicity" 
(Peace 347). This prohibition on secrets is transcendental because: 
a maxim that I cannot divulge without thereby 
defeating my own purpose, one that absolutely must 
be kept secret if it is to succeed and that I cannot 
publicly acknowledge without unavoidably arousing 
everyone's opposition to my project, can derive this 
necessary and universal, hence a priori foreseeable, 
resistance of everyone to me only from the injustice 
with which it threatens everyone (Peace 347). 
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It is for these reasons that Kant regards the transcendental concept of public 
right as a juridical principle as well as an ethical principle. Juridical principles 
have "bearing upon the right of human beings" and as such have bearing on the 
legislative powers of the state (Peace 347). Hence, as we have seen, 
revolutions cannot be rightly legislated and as stated above revolutions are an 
example of secrets, thus we can claim that secrets cannot be legislated. 
It is also true that legislation must be able to be made public if it is to be 
unequivocally just. Hence secret laws are contrary to lawfulness. Given that this 
is the case why then does Kant violate his own transcendental concept of public 
right with the second supplement to the articles necessary for perpetual peace? 
The second supplement is conspicuously entitled a "Secret article for perpetual 
peace." How could there be a secret article for perpetual peace since secrets are 
anathema to the peace process and the legitimacy of law? To understand why 
Kant includes a secret article we must first examine what is allowed to be done 
secretly and the precise nature of how it is secret. 
The secret article for perpetual peace entitles the sovereign of a nation to 
covertly consult the opinion of philosophers when making executive decisions. 
The article stipulates that, "The maxims of philosophers about the conditions 
under which public peace is possible shall be consulted by states armed for war' 
(Peace 337). What this means is that the legislative authority, or law making 
body, which based on Kant's version of republicanism is the monarch, is 
empowered to "seek from its subjects (philosophers) instructions about the 
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principles of conduct toward other states" (Peace 337). The monarch can 
exercise this power by simply "allowing them [its subjects (philosophers)) to 
speak freely and publicly about universal maxims of waging war and establishing 
peace (for that they will do of their own accord, if only they are not forbidden to 
do so)" (Peace 337). 
The way in which the secret article is exercised confuses the issue further 
because it essentially instructs the monarch to secretly allow philosophers to 
speak publicly. What is really being kept secret here? What is being concealed 
is the monarch's consent to freedom of expression. Kant is careful to avoid 
making this consent a legislative act for he is fully aware that "a secret article in 
negotiations of public right is objectively ... a contradiction" (Peace 337). No law 
needs to be passed acknowledging and endorsing this consent. Thus he avoids 
the self contradiction of secret laws; rather, the monarch only needs to give tacit 
consent by not obstructing the public expression of the subject's opinions. 
Tacit consent is a crafty ploy on behalf of Kant to use a double negative to 
open a space for the positive expression of enlightenment. The first negative is 
the negative formulation of the transcendental concept of public right which 
states that there cannot be secret laws. The second negative is the tacit consent 
of the monarch to allow free speech. It is not a positive law. There is nothing 
stating explicitly that the state must endorse free speech only that it does not 
obstruct it. Thus, the tacit consent does not violate the prohibition of the 
transcendental concept of public right. Kant's position on the official relationship 
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of the state and free speech is one of, "don't ask, don't tell". The sovereign does 
not stand in the way of free expression, nor does he ask for advice, and thus the 
official relationship has secretive elements. 
The secretiveness of tacit consent to let philosophers speak freely is made 
more evident when placed in contrast with the explicit solicitation of the opinion of 
lawyers. The opinion of lawyers can be courted openly and publicly because 
lawyers are "representatives of the power of the state" (Peace 337). As 
representatives of the state a lawyer is limited by his or her duty to the state, or 
as Kant puts it, a lawyer's "office is only to apply existing laws but not to 
investigate whether such laws themselves need to be improved" (Peace 337). A 
philosopher's public speech challenges the legislative authority, whereas, the 
private execution of a lawyer's duties to the legislative authority presents no such 
challenge. Thus, according to Kant, the lawyer's opinion can be publicly 
solicited, while the philosopher's opinion must be secretly solicited, via tacit 
consent, because, as he states, "it seems to be humiliating for the legislative 
authority of a state, to which one must naturally ascribe the greatest wisdom, to 
seek from its subjects (philosophers) instruction about the principles of its 
conduct toward other states, and yet very advisable to do so" (Peace 337). 
Because it is advisable for the legislative authority to solicit the opinion of 
philosophers Kant assumes that monarchs will want to do so. They will risk this 
indignity because the purpose of consulting philosophers is "already present in 
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obligation by universal (morally legislative) human reason" (Peace 337). But the 
monarch would be humiliated in front of whom? Whom is the secret kept from? 
Kant answers the question in a bizarrely self-evident statement that "the 
agreement of states with one another on [the point of keeping the secret article] 
requires no special arrangement of states among themselves for this purpose" 
(Peace 337). The statement is self-evident because it begs the question who 
agrees to keep secrets from each other, or even how two nations would be able 
to negotiate such an agreement. Would one sovereign say to another that I 
would like to agree to a maxim that we not tell each other that we are going to 
consult philosophers? Wouldn't the negotiations let the cat out of the bag? It is 
impossible to agree to keep a secret from another party because the terms of the 
secret would have to be revealed in order to arrive at consent. If the terms of the 
secret were not stipulated a party would not know whether they are agreeing to 
the secret consultation of philosophers or the secret use of assassins and 
snipers. Thus any attempt to agree to a secret encounters the critical problem of 
the disruptive power of secrets to mutual trust. 
Since we know that Kant is aware of the threat posed by secrets he 
cannot be so naive as to be speaking literally in the above statement. What can 
be inferred from the statement is that it is not essential that other nations not find 
out about the consultations. Kant is not saying that sovereigns need to inform 
each other. Rather he wants to clarify the fact that it is of no consequence if a 
sovereign were to be found by other sovereigns to be utilizing the advice of 
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philosophers. It is of no consequence because the consultation of philosophers 
is not a detriment to one's neighbors. Philosophers are not like counter 
intelligence agents and spies who disseminate propaganda (Peace 338). 
The likely candidate from whom the secret act must be kept is the same 
person/people Kant identifies with the pronoun "one" in the following line of text. 
He writes, "but it seems to be humiliating for the legislative authority of a state, to 
which one must naturally ascribe the greatest wisdom" (Peace 337). 11 The 
beautiful lie of the infallible wisdom of the sovereign must be preserved for none 
other than his subjects. 
This covert compact runs contrary to Kant's remarks in What is 
Enlightenment where he states that everyone is free to speak their mind on 
public issues insofar as they are not bound by some private duty to obey and 
execute the principle they would otherwise challenge. The general tacit 
agreement to tolerate free speech prescribed in What is Enlightenment is 
restricted to the free expression of philosophers in Toward Perpetual Peace. 
The gradual progress towards enlightenment that grounds What is Enlightenment 
which Kant identifies as "universal (morally legislative) human reason" in 
Towards Perpetual Peace is not charitably attributed to all classes of citizens; 
rather, many of them must be pacified by the beautiful lie of the absolute wisdom 
of the monarch. This is hardly an enlightenment principle. It is rather a not so 
obvious avoidance of an issue that plagues both works, which is, the conflict 
11 Italics added. 
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between the authority of the monarch and the intellectual enfranchisement of the 
masses.12 
In "Kant's Politics of Enlightenment" Ciaran Cronin argues that the 
preservation of the monarch's authority requires that the counsel of philosophers 
must be heeded in secret. Cronin argues that Kant's position of tacit permission 
of free speech is "part of a larger project of reconciling the ideal requirements of 
a republican constitution with the political reality of Prussian absolutism in 
response to contemporary debates concerning the conflicting claims of 
enlightenment and government authority" (53). 13 
One of Cronin's key insights regarding Kant's politics of enlightenment is 
that "Kant advocates freedom in the public use of reason as the guarantor of the 
process of enlightenment that is ideally fully egalitarian and fully autonomous, 
since it is a task that the public must accomplish through its own efforts rather 
than through those of a scholarly elite" (Cronin 53). Although one might argue 
that the covert compact with philosophers is limited to the project of perpetual 
peace and cannot be extended to include a move towards enlightenment, this 
line of argument does not resolve the problem of humiliating the sovereign. 
If the sovereign's dignity cannot withstand the suggestion that he consults 
with philosophers, i.e., the scholarly elite, his dignity certainly could not withstand 
12 Kant's anti-democratic sentiments also reflect this tension, as he states "democracy in the strict sense of 
the word is necessarily despotism" (Peace 324). 
13 Although Cronin is concerned with What is Enlightenment, his thesis that freedom of expression is at the 
center of Kant's attempt to reconcile popular enlightenment with the interests of protecting civil order from 
the tyranny of the masses is equally valid for my analysis of Toward Perpetual Peace. 
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the open and frank discussion of legislative policy in public debate. Thus, if the 
sovereign's dignity is truly as fragile as Kant claims, the sovereign would have to 
create another secret article which allows all citizens to speak freely. This may 
be a logically coherent next step but practically a secret that is kept in the 
confidence of everyone is not a secret at all. Or to put it another way, secrets are 
the weapons of snipers and free riders; they are not another name for maxims 
that can be universalized. In fact, as we saw in the transcendental concept of 
public right, we can know the illegitimacy of a secret due to the inability to make it 
public and universal. By extension then, if free speech can be made universal it 
is not something that needs to be kept secret. Hence, there is no legitimate right 
or law that can justify keeping free speech secret. 
2.4 Moral Arguments for Preferring Peace and Avoiding Secrets: 
The Problem with the Subjective Defense 
Kant defends the secret by claiming that it is justified subjectively. He 
argues that when the secret is "appraised in terms of the quality of the person 
who dictates it, a secret can well be present in them, inasmuch as a person finds 
it prejudicial to his dignity to announce publicly that he is its author" (Peace 337). 
But there is no need to accept such a weak defense and justification. Kant's 
remarks on dignity, wisdom, humiliation, and self-conceit do not support the 
subjective defense of the secret article. It does not hold that it would be 
prejudicial to the sovereign's dignity and humiliating to his wisdom to publicly 
announce his intentions to undertake a project of personal enlightenment. 
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Dignity is not a hollow concept in Kant's moral philosophy. It is not a 
vague notion of something like favorable public image or carrying oneself with 
pride. Dignity is derived from following and performing one's duty to the moral 
law. As Kant writes in the Ground Work of the Metaphysics of Morals, we 
attribute "a certain sublimity and dignity in the person who fulfills all his duties" 
(88). The dignified person is a moral person and more importantly the dignified 
person is one who acts rightly because of a commitment to the moral law and not 
simply by accident or some kind of rarified self interest. Just as good actions do 
not need subjective inclinations to be favored because they are presented to "the 
will that practices them as the object of immediate respect, and nothing by 
reason is required to impose them upon the will" (Groundwork 85), so too is the 
"morally good disposition" recognized as worthy of respect because it is an end 
in itself. As a giver of the universal law the rational being is an end it itself 
(Groundwork 85). As an end in itself the rational being is autonomous and 
worthy of unconditional and incomparable worth which Kant defines as dignity 
(Groundwork 85). 14 
Furthermore, a person who acts from respect for the moral law would 
recognize that there is nothing undignified in supporting the public solicitation of 
the opinion of free thinking citizens. There would be nothing undignified about 
publicly supporting free speech because the moral law is predicated on 
14 The logic Kant uses to define dignity in the Groundwork is analogous to the move from minority to 
enlightenment in What is Enlightenment. When a person is in their minority they are primarily determined 
by subjective conditions. When they become enlightened, on the other hand, they are able to act from 
objective principles. 
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universality. Free speech is the practical externalization of moral reason. Secrets 
are an affront to dignity because they admit that one's actions do not meet the 
burden of the moral law. Thus, arguing that free speech would be prejudicial to 
the sovereign's dignity is a spurious claim at best. It appears that keeping 
secrets would be more prejudicial to the sovereign's dignity than letting his 
subjects speak freely on public issues. But even if secrets are undignified the 
humiliation of having his wisdom challenged may be reason enough to justify the 
sovereign enacting a secret article. However, this is an equally spurious 
justification. 
The humiliation suffered by admitting to a deficiency of wisdom is not a 
cogent justification because according to Kant's account of wisdom everyone 
suffers a deficiency of this particular trait. It is part of the human condition that 
we are not capable of perfect wisdom thus, as Kant states in the Critique of 
Practical Reason, "no one would be justified in professing to be in possession of 
it" (227). Only divine beings could hope for such a blessing, we humans, 
including the sovereign, must be content to have wisdom "as the goal of [our] 
unceasing endeavors" (Practica/227). It is an unending process and given our 
phenomenological being we can only more or less approximate perfection. Thus, 
Kant has no grounds for justifying the shame he attributes to the sovereign based 
on a lack of wisdom. Furthermore, if the sovereign is genuinely to become wiser 
it is necessary for him to seek the counsel of philosophers because philosophers 
are the guardians of science and "science is the narrow gate that leads to the 
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doctrine of wisdom" (Practica/270). Science in this context is practical philosophy 
which is the combination of consciousness of one's duty and wisdom, or the 
"incentive to action," as Kant describes it in the preface to the second part of the 
Metaphysics of Morals (509). 
One reason the sovereign may feel humiliated is if he has false pride in his 
wisdom and believes himself to be perfectly wise. If this is the case the 
humiliation the sovereign feels in the presence of public criticism would serve its 
proper purpose by revealing the dark subterfuge at the core of the secret article. 
The proper function of humiliation is not to reprimand a person for 
having rational self love but rather humiliation strikes down self 
conceit altogether since all claims to esteem for oneself that 
precede in accordance with the moral law are null and quite 
unwarranted because certainty of a disposition in accord with this 
law is the first condition of any worth of a person ... and any 
presumption prior to this is false and opposed to the law (Practical 
203-4). 
The sting of humiliation would reveal the sovereign's self-conceit which 
Kant defines as the unjustified self-love one feels when they take themselves to 
be the author of the moral law and not its dutiful servant. The sovereign is the 
legislative authority of the state but the legitimacy of his rule is not his authority. 
This would simply be a formulation based on might is right. The legitimacy of the 
sovereign's authority is the original contract between the sovereign and his 
subjects and this contract has the power to justify his rule because the original 
contract itself is based on the universality of the moral law. That is to say the 
sovereign is bound to the contract by his duty to the moral law. His authority is 
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contingent on his duty. If he violates his duty he forfeits his authority and I have 
shown that secrets are a legislative contradiction and a moral indignity. 
Thus, a secret act for perpetual peace has neither a legal nor moral 
justification. At the very best it is justified by the fragile vanity and self-conceit of 
the sovereign. Unfortunately for Kant an international peace based on the 
subjective conceit of the sovereign is inadequate grounds for perpetual peace. 
Kant makes a comment in What is Enlightenment which suggests that if social 
order is challenged the sovereign can enact measures to suppress free speech. 
He states that "only one who, himself enlightened, is not afraid of phantoms, but 
at the same time has a well-disciplined and numerous army ready to guarantee 
public peace, can say what a free state may not dare to say: Argue as much as 
you will and about what you will; only obey'' (Enlightenment 22)! The requirement 
of the army suggests that the sovereign could use such force if free speech 
threatens his authority and the social order. Even if we ignore the third 
preliminary article for perpetual peace that calls for the abolition of standing 
armies, Kant must still contend with the problem that the sovereign may not be 
enlightened. And this is a real concern for Kant because he acknowledges the 
need for a secret article which promulgates the beautiful lie stating that the 
greatest wisdom be ascribed to the sovereign. If the sovereign is unenlightened 
he very well may be afraid of phantoms, the phantoms of his fragile vanity, and 
construing these phantoms as a challenge to his authority he may call out his 
army to suppress the free speech that gives his phantoms their threatening 
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voice. History is littered with examples where the vanity of rulers and the use of 
oppressive tactics are harmful to the enlightened and peaceful existence of 
nations and their citizens. And as Kant astutely notes in the fifth preliminary 
article for perpetual peace a nation in a state of civil war and revolution has no 
rightful claim to national sovereignty because it is after all in a state of anarchy 
which is tantamount to a state of war (Peace 319-320). 
This collapse into civil war is not merely a threat to a single nation; the 
state of anarchy transforms the fifth preliminary article into a loophole that an 
opportunistic sovereign could use to invade neighboring lands. A fifth preliminary 
article so transformed by the secret article would violate the first preliminary 
article's command that peace treaties be entered into without secret reservation 
to break the terms of the article at some future date (Peace 317). The first 
preliminary article is not violated per se since waiting for civil war to erupt does 
not require that one keep a secret; but it would be difficult to foster commodious 
international relations when nations are continually wishing for misfortune to 
befall their neighbors. The involvement of one nation in the affairs of another in 
the event of civil war outlined by the fifth preliminary article's conditional 
permission would be the occasion whereby an opportunistic sovereign could 
circumvent the foundational prohibitions of the first preliminary article (Peace 
219-20). Hence, a sovereign with hostile expansionist intentions could enter into 
a peace treaty with another nation even though he has no intention of keeping 
the treaty. Yet he need not violate the terms of the treaty to fulfill his expansionist 
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aims. Knowing that his opponent has followed the secret article all that the 
opportunistic sovereign need do is wait until his opponent's nation collapses into 
civil war and then move in all the while following Kant's preliminary articles for 
perpetual peace to the letter. 
Kant believes that secrets that are kept within a nation, that is secrets that are 
withheld from a citizenry by its government, are not a threat to international 
peace. He believes this to be the case because such secrets do not pose a 
direct threat to neighboring nations in the same way that standing armies and 
assassins present a threat. What he fails to realize is that the subjective attempt 
to hold secrets within a nation erodes the moral integrity of the sovereign and the 
legitimacy of the government's right to rule and thus may plunge the nation into a 
state of civil war. Kant did not foresee that trading external secrets for internal 
secrets is the same as trading international war for civil war. In either scenario 
the rights afforded to a nation by peace would be blown away by the winds of 
war. 
The subjective defense falls short as either an explanation of or a 
justification for the secret article. Yet Kant was convinced of its necessity and 
this cannot be summarily discounted and dismissed. The secret article has more 
of the air of a primer on manners than it does a moral imperative. Citizens are to 
act as if the sovereign is the wisest of all people: and this does not have the 
objective status of moral imperatives, rather it is in keeping with good taste and 
manners to avoid humiliating the sovereign. This is not unlike Kant's caveat that 
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a state's citizens should be free to express whatever ideas they want so long as 
they obey. Obedience and deference to the sovereign's wisdom may be like the 
contractual obligation citizens have to obey their sovereign as they would to pay 
their taxes. It is quite common to defer to the judgment of politicians in 
representative democracies. As representatives of the people they are 
empowered to make judgments on behalf of the people. It is not that these 
judgments are beyond reproach; rather, from time to time the electorate must live 
with their dissatisfaction. As the old cliche goes people get the government they 
deserve. Or at least they have to live with the government they chose to 
represent them. The next chapter will examine the secret article in light of the 
contractual language of the public and private use of reason articulated in What 
is Enlightenment. By moving it out of the moral context and into the context of 
the public use of reason the contradiction of the secret article can be resolved 
and its necessity can be understood as part of Kant's politics of enlightenment.15 
15 The reasons why Kant would chose the subjective defense can be understood once such an argument for 
the politics of enlightenment is in place. 
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Chapter Three 
Trust Beyond Contracts 
Scholars of Toward Perpetual Peace often over look the secret article and those 
few who do address it consider it to be an instance of Kantian irony (Kuijlen 839). 
They claim that Kant is not sincere about the secrecy of the secret article. Willem 
van der Kuijlen notes that "this irony stems from the fact that the secrecy is in 
contradiction with the demand for publicity and from the fact that Kant gives away 
the secret by publishing it in [Toward Perpetual Peace]" (839). An ironic reading 
defuses the problem of the secret. Subsequently, analysis of the article does not 
seriously address the contradiction. 
However, an ironic reading is inadequate for two reasons. First, Kant was 
serious and sincere. As Chapter Two demonstrated, his careful classification of 
the contradiction as objective and his subsequent subjective defense of the 
article indicate that Kant viewed the contradiction as a serious challenge to the 
coherence of his argument that was worthy of the time and effort necessary to 
address the problem. Such analysis on his part suggests that Kant was not 
dismissive of the secret article. 
Second, the secret of the secret article is not for Kant to keep. The secret 
resides with the sovereign. Thus, Kant did not let any cats out of any bags by 
publishing the secret article. It is not a secret article for the actions of 
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philosophers; rather, it is an article which advises the sovereign to act in secret. 
A sovereign may choose to follow the advice of Kant's secret article without 
informing anyone he is doing so and thus maintain the secrecy. While 
philosophers are granted freedom of expression by the article, rather it is the 
consideration of philosophical expression that ought to be conducted in secret. It 
is the ear of the sovereign and not the mouth of the philosopher which is 
shrouded by the secret article. 16 Thus the argument that the publication of the 
article demonstrates its ironic quality reveals a misunderstanding as to whom and 
what the secret applies because this argument implies that the secret is for Kant 
to keep. 
Rather than dismissing the importance of the secret article with an ironic 
reading, I propose that the article be read in the context of Kant's discussion of 
the public and private use of reason in a text that predates Toward Perpetual 
Peace by eleven years. In September of 1784 Kant published An answer to the 
question: What is Enlightenment advising his liege, Frederick the Great, not to 
interfere with the freedom of publication and conscience. With the publication of 
Toward Perpetual Peace, Kant counseled sovereigns to secretly take under 
advisement philosophers' reflections on statecraft. What is Enlightenment was 
16 At this juncture I argue that the publication of the article does not render the secret immaterial. This 
should not be confused with or seen to be in contradiction to the argument I make later in this chapter that 
Kant had to obfuscate the purpose of the secret article. In the first instance I am referring to the theoretical 
content ofthe article, i.e., the covert consultation of philosophers, and in the second instance I am referring 
to the practical historical and political concerns Kant was required to address when publishing the article. 
Ironic readings do not differentiate between the two secrets and this causes some confusion when 
interpreting the role and value of the article. 
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just such a reflection. It commented on the limits of government's role to promote 
and prohibit public and private uses of reason. 
There are three reasons for reading the secret article in the context of 
What is Enlightenment. First, as I have just mentioned, What is Enlightenment is 
precisely the kind of advice the secret article is designed to protect. Second, the 
two texts are thematically related. The secret article and What is Enlightenment 
are concerned with the issue of free expression. Third, and most importantly, 
What is Enlightenment outlines Kant's position on what it means to be 
enlightened as well as the process of becoming enlightened. This is of particular 
importance for a successful reading of the secret article because, as I 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, Kant must contend with the problem of an 
unenlightened sovereign since the subjective defense promulgates the beautiful 
lie that the grandest wisdom be ascribed to the sovereign. 
It is the thesis of this chapter that if the secret article is to be a coherent 
part of Kant's philosophy, it must be understood as the means for addressing the 
problem of enlightening the sovereign. I argue that the secret article facilitates 
the enlightenment of the sovereign. Furthermore, the secrecy of the secret article 
may be defended in terms of the public and private use of reason given in What 
is Enlightenment. Private citizens must obey the rule of the sovereign, as if his 
dictums have the legitimacy of an infinitely wise author. For example, if citizens 
wish to remain members of their community they must pay taxes with which they 
may disagree. However, they can publicly criticize the wisdom of the sovereign's 
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tax plan without jeopardizing their membership in the community. This chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the reasons why, in spite of it short comings, Kant 
chose the subjective defense for the secret article. 
3.1 The Politics of Enlightenment 
Chapter one of this thesis opened with a delineation of types of 
trustworthy relationships. Trust can be established bilaterally as in the case of a 
contract were the regulations for intelligible behavior are explicitly stated by the 
duties required by the contract. It may also be established unilaterally whereby 
one side of a relationship extends the courtesy of regular and intelligible behavior 
to the other without explicit consultation with and consent of the other party. Kant 
alludes to this type of trust when he advises nations to act in a rational manner 
towards their enemies. The third type of trustworthy relationship is based on the 
premise that both parties can be trusted to act in there own best interests. At this 
point I would like to add a fourth type to the list and this is type of trustworthy 
relationship where both parties act on the basis reason. Parties can trust one 
another if they act in accordance with, and base their action on, what is rational. 
Acting from reason is the benchmark for enlightened behavior for Kant. 17 Even 
though Kant identifies enlightenment with the freedom to act in accordance with 
17 This is a broad and foundational theme in Kant's moral and political philosophy. As Wolfgang Kersting 
put it in his essay for The Cambridge Companion to Kant, "the theory of self-legislation of pure practical 
reason developed in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Moral (1785) and Critique of Practical Reason 
(1788) stands at the center of [Kant's practical philosophy]" (Kersting 342). 
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reason, unfortunately acting in accordance with reason is not a straight forward 
matter because many people are in what he calls their minority. 
In What is Enlightenment Kant segregates the use of reason into public 
use, private use, and a less clearly defined, inner use. Although Kant does not 
explicitly discuss the inner use of reason and he never names it as such, he does 
appeal to "inner religion" as a guide against ecclesiastic conservatism 
(Enlightenment 18). This inner reason, as I am calling it, also seems to be at 
work in the hearts and minds of a "few independent thinkers ... among the 
established guardians ... who [have] cast off the yoke of minority" (Enlightenment 
17). These free thinkers must have used their inner reason to cast off their yokes 
because it is not possible that they accomplished their enlightenment as a 
publicly fostered process given the anthropological description of the bulk of 
humanity, or the public, as unenlightened. How could the public be enlightened? 
For, if they were, Kant would not need to plead a case for public enlightenment to 
Frederick. Kant states that "for this enlightenment, however, nothing is required 
but freedom, and indeed the least harmful of anything that could even be called 
freedom: namely the freedom to make public use of one's reason in all matters" 
(Enlightenment 18). 
The thesis of What is Enlightenment states that the unfettered use of 
reason in the public sphere is both necessary and sufficient for enlightenment. 
Kant defines enlightenment as the "human being's emergence from his self-
incurred minority" (Enlightenment 17). He goes on to clarify that "Minority is the 
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inability to make use of one's own understanding without direction from another" 
(Enlightenment 18). Because understanding and reason are equivalent terms in 
What is Enlightenment, enlightenment can be understood as the self-directed 
use of one's reason. The free thinker is the enlightened person, or perhaps more 
properly, the enlightened person is a free thinker. He or she has their own 
rational deliberation as the aim or guiding principle of their understanding. 
Although Kant defines minority in terms of being directed by another, there 
are actually three possible reasons for being in a state of minority. The first 
reason is a "lack of understanding." However Kant only mentions this in passing 
and does not give it any serious consideration (Enlightenment 17). Kant is not 
concerned with the non-rational, or those who do not possess the capacity for 
rational thought; rather, he is concerned with those individuals who have the 
potential to use their reason, but do not. This brings us to the remaining two 
reasons why someone may be in their minority. First, one can be in one's 
minority due to the victimization of coercive oppression and imposition of minority 
by an external power. Second, there exists self imposed minority whereby a 
person does not exercise their reason even though there are no external 
impediments. Kant suggests that this may occur because of some other 
character flaw, such as laziness and a love of comfort or because of cowardice 
and a lack of courage to encounter the risks involved with thinking for oneself. 
In What is Enlightenment, Kant is primarily concerned with the problem of 
self imposed minority because it is a pervasive problem in terms of religious 
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belief and freedom of conscience. Kant argues that there is a strong temptation 
to not use your reason when you have a "book that understands for [you and] a 
spiritual advisor who has a conscience for [you)" (Enlightenment 17). Although 
Kant argues against grounding morality in religion, he is not opposed to religion; 
rather, he is anti-dogmatic, as is evident by his comments on the impossibility of 
the authority of a society of clergymen to "bind itself by oath to a certain 
unalterable creed, in order to carry on an unceasing guardianship over each of its 
members and by means of them over the people, and even to perpetuate this" 
(Enlightenment 19-20). This sort of dogmatic legalism would be impossible 
according to Kant since the unalterability would be a crime against human nature 
given that "the touchstone of whatever can be decided upon as law for a people 
lies in the question: whether a people could impose such a law upon itself' 
(Enlightenment 20). All laws have to be open to and able to withstand rational 
scrutiny if they are to be binding upon a people. Kant is seldom 18 swayed by 
historical arguments for the continuance of a given practice: an enlightened 
people cannot live in accordance with the dictates put forth during a prior and 
possibly less enlightened time. 
However, traditions are enduring and they are engrained in individuals 
through reliance on "precepts and formulas, those mechanical instruments of 
rational use, or rather misuse, of this natural endowment," and these "are the ball 
and chain of everlasting minority" (Enlightenment 17). The ball and chain do not 
18 It is important to stress the word seldom as opposed to never. In the Metaphysics of Morals, for example, 
Kant allows historical arguments for supporting the practice of dueling ( 4 7 6-7). 
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have to be literal, rather they are more effective when they are figurative, 
because then they are made invisible and become traditional formulaic thought 
which is mistaken for the free use of reason. 19 Thus, as Kant accurately notes, "it 
is difficult for any single individual to extricate himself from the minority that has 
become almost nature to him" (Enlightenment 17). In effect, Kant is arguing that 
a project of private liberation is unlikely to take hold and be successful because 
only a very few are able to live in accordance with reason by consulting their 
inner reason, and are able to find the energy and courage to overcome the 
pressures and temptations of minority. 
Realizing the unlikelihood that private liberation will succeed, Kant argues 
that enlightenment must be brought about by a project of public freedom. Thus, 
he calls on the sovereign to limit his input into matters of conscience and 
publication. 
In order to sell this project to Frederick the Great, Kant employed much 
flattery, calling Frederick the only enlightened monarch in Europe, and he 
employed a strategy of convincing Frederick that public freedom is not a threat to 
his sovereignty. Both the rhetorical and argumentative strategies reinforce each 
other in the line "Only one ruler in the world says: Argue as much as you will and 
19 In Contingency, Irony, Solidarity, Rorty describes common sense in terms of a self imposed minority and 
the insipid effectiveness of common sense to usurp free thinking is well illustrated by both Foucault and 
Althusser. In his discussion of state apparatus, Althusser makes the observation that coercion is most fully 
realized when the coerced comply to it willingly. In To Discipline and Punish, Foucault's panopticon also 
demonstrates this point by showing that prisoners in a panopticon internalize censorship of their behavior 
and in effect perform self censorship. They impose their minority upon themselves, to use Kant's language. 
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about whatever you will, but obey!" Kant must now make the case to Frederick 
that public freedom will not breed disobedience and incite revolution. 
To make his case for extending the freedom to dissent and to criticize the 
government and the church, Kant limited his plea to enfranchising the educated 
elite. Kant was not arguing for total freedom of expression but rather the more 
limited freedom of publication. Giving educated scholarly men a voice is one 
thing; giving the rabble, who in all likelihood would have been unable to read and 
write, a political voice is quite another. But to make his case to Frederick, Kant 
realized that even the political efficacy of the educated must be tempered in 
order to demonstrate that social order could and would continue. 
Considering that the private liberation of reason is unlikely, it makes 
perfect sense to limit the private use of reason since there is nothing to be lost by 
imposing this limitation. Kant argues that even educated people must be 
obedient in the private use of their reason. He makes a sharp distinction between 
the public and the private use of reason based on the premise that in the private 
use of one's reason, a person is acting "merely passively." In the private sphere, 
a person's reason is used as an instrument and they are only reasoning 
formulaically. 
His differentiation of the private and public uses or reason logically 
foreshadows his famous hypothetical/categorical distinction although he did not 
use this distinction in 1784. The instrumental use of reason that signifies the 
private sphere is one and the same as hypothetical reason. 
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The hypothetical/categorical distinction is a central feature of Kant's 
practical philosophy. Reference to the distinction appears in the Ground Work 
for the Metaphysical of Morals (1785), The Critique of Practical Reason (1788) 
and The Metaphysics of Moral (1797). Imperatives are integral to Kant's 
definition of practical reason. In the Ground Work Kant begins his discussion of 
practical reason by stating that "everything in nature works in accordance with 
laws. Only a rational being has the capacity to act in accordance with the 
representation of laws, that is, in accordance with principles, or has a wilf' (66). 
This is Kant's definition of a free individual. A free individual is one who can act 
in accordance with their reason. He equates the will with practical reason itself. 
In fact the "will is nothing other than practical reason" (Ground Work 66). Having 
said that, Kant is quick to note that human beings are not like angels and that the 
human will is not perfect. It is not perfectly free to follow objectively necessary 
conclusions of reason; rather the human will is also conditioned by what is 
subjectively necessary. (Ground Work 66). Subjective conditions arise from the 
particularity of an individual human's spatio-temporal circumstance. Although 
subjective conditions are contingent they are no less necessary than purely 
rational representations. Having established reason as the range of free action, 
Kant then goes on to discuss the various representations of laws that one can act 
in accordance with which are hypothetical and categorical imperatives. He writes, 
all imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. The 
former represent the practical necessity of a possible action as a 
means to achieving something else one wills (or that it is at least 
possible for one to will). The categorical imperative would be that 
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which represented an action as objectively necessary of itself, 
without reference to another end ... if the action would be good 
merely as a means to something else the imperative is 
hypothetical; if the action is represented as in itself good, hence as 
necessary in a will in itself conforming to reason, as its principle, 
then it is categorical (Ground Work 66-7). 
Kant also refers to hypothetical imperatives as imperatives of skill and 
similarly calls categorical imperatives moral imperatives (Ground Work 68-9). 
Hypothetical imperatives command that if a particular end is to be obtained then 
an individual must perform a skill in accordance with achieving that end. A 
carpenter must level a foundation in order to build a stable house. In general 
hypothetical imperatives require dutiful performance of a particular action to 
satisfy a particular end and in this sense contracts can be seen as hypothetical 
imperatives. Contracts are an agreement between two or more parties to act in a 
certain way so as to secure a particular end. Contractual obligations need not 
have a moral imperative. There is a moral obligation to abide by the contracts 
one has entered into, but the specific terms of the contract need not have moral 
relevance. There is no moral requirement for the neighbor's kid to cut my grass, 
but once we have entered into a contract she is obligated to perform the task as 
set out by the terms of the agreement. 
As private actors, people are not required to consider the good, but only 
the useful. A successful soldier would have to be able to calculate the trajectory 
of an artillery barrage, but he is not required to question the good of the barrage 
beyond its strategic importance. Kant demonstrates the difference between the 
private and public use of reason by arguing that, 
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it would be ruinous if an officer, receiving an order from his 
superiors, wanted while on duty to engage openly in subtle 
reasoning about its appropriateness or utility; he must obey. But he 
cannot fairly be prevented, as a scholar, from making remarks 
about errors in the military services and from putting these before 
his public for appraisal (Enlightenment 18-19). 
And likewise, 
a citizen cannot refuse to pay the taxes imposed upon him; an 
impertinent censure of such levies when he is to pay them may 
even be punished as a scandal ... But the same citizen does not 
act against the duty of a citizen when, as a scholar, he publicly 
expresses his thoughts about the inappropriateness or even 
injustice of such decrees (Enlightenment 19). 
The citizen like the soldier must obey and follow the duties that are contractually 
incumbent upon them regardless whether or not the contracts meet the burden of 
the moral law. Contracts bind the parties involved to follow hypothetical 
imperatives. If a citizen wants to be protected from hostile neighbors he or she 
must pay taxes to fund the sovereign's military and if soldiers are ordered to 
defend the interests of their country they must follow the chain of command and 
exercise their training and neither the citizen nor the soldier is expected or 
required to question the justness of these actions?0 
Even though it appears that Kant is making concessions to Frederick 
when he makes the caveat that people must obey their contractual obligations, 
he has really given the sovereign nothing more than what he already has in his 
20 In light of such events as the Nuremberg Trials, the VietNam War and conscientious objection, Kant's 
analysis may seem foreign to the contemporary reader. It should be noted that institutional practices which 
persist even to this day contain traces of Kant's definition ofthe private use of reason. Many military 
academies were founded to teach the hypothetical skills related to field engineering and continue to excel at 
teaching engineering, although aeronautics has surpassed ballistics as the main focus of instruction. 
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possession. If Kant is sincere in his claim that the majority of people mistake 
precepts and formulae for reason, then by granting continuing obedience in the 
instrumental use of reason to the sovereign, Kant has in fact added nothing more 
to the sovereign's power than he currently possesses. Frederick already 
commands the private obedience of his subjects through the binding obligations 
placed on the citizen and the sovereign by the original contract, as discussed in 
Chapter One. 
The public/private distinction satisfies the citizen's obligation to abide by 
the sovereign's authority without ensnaring the sovereign in the trap of self-
conceit. The sovereign, need not fear criticism; rather, he has the freedom to 
listen to public debate. The freedom to listen is not available to unenlightened 
rulers or those who cannot avail themselves of the secret article. The rule of 
strongmen, godheads and tyrants demand that they be beyond reproach. Leo 
Strauss' translation and analysis of Thucydides' Tyrannicus exemplifies the 
pressure to be perfect that is placed on a tyrant. Hiero, the protagonist of 
Tyrannicus, repeatedly complains that the tyrant is at a disadvantage compared 
to a common citizen because the expectation of greatness placed upon the tyrant 
results in the burden of having to appear infallible. For example, Hiero notes that 
even the taste and pleasures available to the tyrant are assumed to be beyond 
the realm of normal people. He states, 
that the majority judge that [tyrants] drink and eat with more 
pleasure than private men, believing they themselves would dine 
more pleasantly on the dish served to us than the one served to 
them; for what surpasses the ordinary causes the pleasures. For 
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this reason all human beings save tyrants anticipate feasts with 
delight. For [tyrants'] tables are always prepared for them is such 
that they admit no possibility of increase at feasts. So ... in this 
pleasure of hope [tyrants] are worse off than private men (Strauss 
5). 
Kant provides an innovative resolution to the conflict by preserving the 
authority of the sovereign while undermining the illusion of perfection that 
authority seemingly demands. 21 Kant's sovereign need not be the guardian of 
wisdom to be a legitimate ruler. Rather, the legitimacy of Kant's sovereign is 
grounded on the embodiment of the original contract in the free expression of 
citizens on matters of public good. 
The public sphere, and not the subjective moral sphere, provides a truly 
tacit space for the enlightenment of the sovereign. The public sphere is truly tacit 
because it is non-contractual. It is outside the hypothetical use of reason 
necessitated by the explicit nature of contractual relationships. The public 
sphere, rather, provides a context for trustworthy relationships to be formed on 
the basis of the tacit assumption that enlightened individuals will act in 
accordance with reason. Kuijlen makes a similar point when he states that the 
secret article allows for the disciplining of thought in accordance with reason 
which is necessary for the public expression of individuals' thoughts. He writes 
that, "that it is necessary for them to have executed a previous power to 
discipline any polemical use" (Kuijlen 845). The previous power he is making 
reference to is the power to discipline one's thought in accordance with reason. 
21 For this reason Kant's analysis of the relationship between the philosopher and the sovereign can be seen 
as a radical departure from the platonic tradition of the philosopher king. 
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Kant expresses this relationship in the concluding remarks of What is 
Enlightenment. Kant envisions a day when soldiers can engage in categorical 
reasoning while executing their duties. Just as intellectual minority can be 
overcome in the public sphere, so too blind obedience can be put to rest in the 
private. Kant writes, 
here a strange, unexpected course is revealed in human affairs, as 
happens elsewhere too if it is considered in the large, where almost 
everything is paradoxical. A greater degree of civil freedom seems 
advantageous to a people's freedom of spirit and nevertheless puts 
up insurmountable barriers to it; a lesser degree of the former, on 
the other hand, provides a space for the latter to expand to its full 
capacity. Thus when nature has unwrapped, from under this hard 
shell, the seed for which she cares most tenderly, namely the 
propensity and calling to think freely, the latter gradually works back 
upon the mentality of the people (which thereby gradually becomes 
capable of freedom in action) and eventually even upon the 
principles of government, which finds it profitable to itself to treat 
the human being who is now more than a machine, in keeping with 
his dignity (Enlightenment 22). 
The protections to the monarch's sovereignty that are ensured by 
obedience will wither away when there is a general condition of free thinking 
individuals who are treated and treat each other in accordance with their dignity. 
Even though the repressive guarantees will no longer be in place, there will be no 
risk to the sovereign because he will understand that it is profitable to let people 
use their categorical reason in all matters. Kant can be certain of this harmony 
between the private and the public because, in a condition where the sovereign 
and the citizen are both enlightened then both will act in accordance with their 
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inner reason. However, when all people are treated in accordance with their 
dignity there will be no difference between inner reason and public reason.22 
3.2 An Enlightened Reading of the Secret Article 
In his essay Transcendental Reasoning in Kant's Treatise on Perpetual 
Peace Arto Siitonen draws attention to several passages in Perpetual Peace 
which support my reading of Perpetual Peace in the context for What is 
Enlightenment. Similarly to my enlightenment argument, Siitonen argues that 
reason is required for the moral development of nation states as well as 
individuals. Unfortunately Siitonen ignores the subtle importance of 
distinguishing between the free use of reason versus the more mechanical 
hypothetical use of reason. Siitonen highlights two particularly interesting 
passages. He notes that Kant establishes peace on a foundational principle and 
identifies this principle as reason. He cites the following two passages from 
Kant, 
1) " ... it will be well to discover the ultimate principle from which the end of 
perpetual peace is derived" (Siitonen 867). 
2) There is only one rational way in which states coexisting with other 
states can emerge from the lawless condition of pure warfare. Just 
like individual men, they must renounce their savage and lawless 
freedom, admit themselves to public coercive laws, and thus form 
an international state (civitas gentium), which would necessarily 
continue to grow until it embraces all the people of the earth 
(Siitonen 867). 
22 Of course this will most likely never come completely to be and after all the full title of Perpetual Peace 
is Toward Perpetual Peace. 
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Siitonen notices Kant's analogy between the savage freedom shared by 
individuals and states and that it is necessary for both people and nations to 
relinquish their savage freedom in order to be recognized as autonomous and 
deserving of rights upon which Kant bases true freedom. 
Van der Kuijlen also recognizes the need in Kant's system for autonomous 
agents to relinquish a primal freedom in order to gain a more sophisticated, full 
and secure freedom. This is the basis of van der Kuijlen's argument that it is 
necessary for citizens to exercise the power of reason, that is to test their ideas 
against what Siitonen notes as the "ultimate principle," before they can act 
politically (Kuijlen 845). And like Siitonen, he looks to the demand for publicity 
required by the Transcendental Concept of Public Right to resolve the issue. 
Siitonen believes that publicity will expose the machinations of political 
opportunists whose use of law for selfish ends is incompatible with the ultimate 
principle of reason. Vander Kuijlen holds that the requirement for publicity will 
override the secrecy of the secret article and thus confirm its ironic status. 
However, both of these readings assume a degree of transparency 
between moral laws and practical action to which Kant himself did not subscribe. 
In the Metaphysics of Morals Kant plainly states that "ethics do not give laws for 
actions, but only for maxims of actions" (520). He explains this pithy statement 
arguing that 
The concept of duty stands in immediate relation to law ... The 
formal principle of duty, in the categorical imperative "So act that 
the maxim of your actions could become a universal law," already 
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indicates this. Ethics adds only that this principle is to thought as 
the law of your will and not of will in general, which could also be 
the will of others; in the latter case the laws would provide a duty of 
right, which lies outside the sphere of ethics. - Maxims are here 
regarded as subjective principles which merely qualify for a giving 
of universal law, and the requirement that they so qualify is only a 
negative principle (not to come into conflict with a law as such) 
(Metaphysics of Morals 520). 
Kant is careful to note that the Transcendental Concept of Public Right is a 
negative law. In the context of the statements about negative laws in the 
preceding passage it is clear that the Transcendental Concept of Public Right 
does not have the strength of an objective principle necessary to justify Siitonen's 
and van der Kuijlen's reliance on it. 
However, by expanding the analogy that Siitonen highlights to encompass 
the trope of leaving one's minority and entering into moral maturity presented in 
What is Enlightenment, I open up a new reading which is not susceptible to the 
need for transparency which plagues van der Kuijlen's and Siitonen's readings of 
Perpetual Peace. 
Leaving one's minority is analogous to surrendering one's savage freedom 
and moral maturity and autonomy are analogous terms as well. The private use 
of reason in What is Enlightenment is devised by Kant to mediate between the 
"ultimate principle" of the free public use of reason and the practical limitations 
required by hypothetical duties put in place by contractual relationships. 
Hypothetical imperatives may or may not be in accordance with the moral law 
and the ultimate principle of perpetual peace. Thus by following hypothetical 
imperatives the private use of reason is not comprised of transparent moral 
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imperatives. While Kant argues that there is a moral imperative against 
committing suicide, soldiers are expected to give their lives for their country in the 
line of duty (Groundwork 73-4, 80). They have a private duty that does not 
conform perfectly to the moral law. The private use of reason is designed to 
create a space that permits the political commitments dictated by contractual 
relationships while maintaining a space for moral obligations. Moreover, the 
space Kant creates between the public and private uses of reason mediates the 
worldly limitations that prevent the easy application of moral imperatives to 
human activities. Thus, even though contracts are binding, private hypothetical 
imperatives are open to criticism in the public sphere. For example, public debate 
can be critical of sending soldiers off to fight and die in foreign lands, even 
though the soldiers have a duty to follow orders. Public debate questions the 
wisdom of the orders as opposed to the soldier's obligation to follow orders. The 
private use of reason is an example of where Kant avoids the seductive simplicity 
of transparent applications of the moral law and the pitfall of mechanical 
legalisms that are regrettably popular among many commentators on Perpetual 
Peace. The private use of reason necessitates the non-legalistic and non-
procedural judgments of autonomous actors who freely use their reason. The 
private use of reason necessitates the public use of reason because it is 
insufficient for examining the hypothetical imperatives that dictate private action. 
The procedures that enable a quartermaster to outfit troop deployments, for 
example, are not helpful in assessing the wisdom of the deployment. The limits of 
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the private use of reason are true for both citizens within a republic, as well as, 
heads of state. 
Furthermore, unlike Siitonen's and van der Kuijlen's legalistic readings, a 
non-procedural, non-transparent reading is in line with Kant's longing for and 
prohibition against a universal world government. Kant laments the lack of 
efficacy of the transparent solution of a global government in the following 
passage, 
but in accordance with their idea of the right of nations, they do not 
at all want this, thus rejecting in hypothesi what is correct in thesi; 
so (if all is not to be lost) in place of the positive idea of a world 
republic only the negative surrogate of a league that averts war, 
endures, and always expands can hold back the stream of hostile 
inclination that shies away from right, though with constant danger 
of its breaking out (Peace 328). 
The fodus pacificum at the center of Kant's federalism, like the private use of 
reason central to his project of enlightenment, is an example of where Kant 
avoids the seductive simplicity of transparent applications of the moral law and 
the pitfall of mechanical legalisms. Rather he presents subtle moral and political 
arguments that are designed to address the limitations incumbent on practical 
action while preserving the dignity of free rational agents, in this case the 
sovereignty of republics. 
Rather than understand the secret article as a contradiction that must be 
dismissed as ironic or ignored, I argue that it is like the private use of reason and 
the fodus pacificum. The article is another example of Kant's rejection of 
seductively transparent applications of the moral law in favor of practical politics 
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that address moral shortcomings without usurping the autonomy of rational 
agents. The secret article is consistent with his project of enlightenment. 
Although the article challenges the easy application of moral theory to political 
practice it does not prevent moral growth. In fact, the article is designed to create 
a space within practical limitations for the free use of reason. The article 
mediates between the practical requirement to preserve the sovereign's authority 
and the practical limits of the sovereign's minority. By addressing the problem of 
sovereign minority the article supports Kant's project of enlightenment. 
In the particular case of the secret article Kant provides a solution to the 
conflict created between the sovereign's authority and his or her imperfect 
wisdom. Citizens trust the sovereign to act in their best interests and demand 
nothing short of infallibility. In an ideal world this would not be too much to ask of 
the sovereign, but in reality the sovereign may not be enlightened. He or she 
may not yet be free from their minority let alone infallible. Thus Kant prescribes 
that citizens must attribute the greatest wisdom to the sovereign, while the 
sovereign in turn undertakes a project of personal enlightenment by tacitly 
listening to the advice of philosophers and learned citizens. In this way the 
sovereign's authority remains intact because he or she appears to be guided by 
their inner reason and in fact the sovereign is moving towards free and 
autonomous reason which is necessary for in turn moving toward perpetual 
peace. 
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3.3 The Politics of the Subjective Defense: 
From a Theory to a Practise of Enlightenment. 
One may still wish to ask why Kant chose the weaker of two defenses for his 
justification of the secret article. His subjective defense for the secret article 
based on an appeal to the sovereign's dignity falls short, and a more robust 
defense of the article may be found in the role for educating the sovereign, which 
is developed in the argument of this thesis. Clues for answering this question can 
be found in a careful examination of the implications had Kant chosen the more 
robust argument. 
The stronger defense for the secret article is based on facilitating the 
enlightenment of the sovereign. It creates a space for his personal education 
and aligns his inner reason with rationally based free public expression. The 
problem with an explicit argument for the enlightenment of the sovereign is that it 
carries with it the inescapable implication that the sovereign is unenlightened. 
After all, those who are in need of enlightenment are the unenlightened. And, 
while the claim that the sovereign is in need of enlightenment may be offensive to 
the sovereign's dignity, it is more importantly a challenge to the legitimacy of his 
rule. 
The identification of unenlightened ignorance with "minority", in What is 
Enlightenment, is the key to understanding the challenge to the sovereign's 
authority presented by the enlightenment defense. Kant defines being in one's 
minority as "the inability to make use of one's own understanding without 
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direction from another "(Enlightenment 18). Being a minor is debilitating for 
normal citizens because their understanding is not their own. In a state of 
minority citizens would not be able to act for themselves nor be responsible for 
their actions. For the sovereign the effects of minority are far worse because his 
responsibility is far greater. Just as the citizens' autonomy is compromised when 
they are directed by another, the sovereign's authority is also compromised when 
he is shown to be directed by another. 
At this point the effects of Kant's alignment of sovereign authority with 
rationality can be seen. When the sovereign is shown to be irrational it logically 
follows that his authority is challenged. Thus by being in his minority, and hence 
directed by another, the authority of the sovereign is dissolved because it is 
revealed that he is not the author of the laws of the state. His decrees and rule 
are directed by another. Thus, the sovereign who is unenlightened, and a minor, 
is little more than a puppet to some external influence. This is the inescapable 
implication of the robust enlightenment defense of the secret article. Kant's 
subjective defense is an attempt to create a space for the sovereign's 
enlightenment without directly challenging his authority. 
However, realizing the threat of the robust defense to the sovereign's 
authority is only a partial understanding of the reason Kant chose the subjective 
defense. Given that the only legitimate ground for authority is reason, and, given 
that Kant had the robust defense as a powerful tool for exposing that the emperor 
has no clothes, one may still ask, why then would he chose to drape the royal 
65 
puppet in dignified adornments? To answer this question, we need to 
understand what external forces determine the actions of the most powerful 
person in the realm, as well as Kant's position on the legitimacy of revolutionary 
governments. 
The robust defense is a thorough attack on the rule of the unenlightened 
sovereign given the foundational role of rational political legitimacy. Thus, if Kant 
were openly to voice this purpose for the secret article he would invite all manner 
of challengers to the throne. In order to preserve the sovereign's authority while 
exploring the rightful conditions for rule Kant must appear to support the 
sovereign while creating an opportunity for the sovereign to come into 
possession of his reason. Although Frederick's claim to the throne is not based 
on an appeal to reason, but rather on an appeal to tradition and genealogy, Kant 
must nevertheless respect the sovereign's claim to the throne in the execution of 
his private and civic duty to the state. Frederick's coronation, not his just 
governance, gave him the right23 to rule. Once again Kant's comments on 
minority are instructive and indicate that tradition is the external determinant of 
the sovereign. 
The unenlightened sovereign would likely disagree that he is in his 
minority. Who, after all, could tell him what to do for he is the highest power in the 
realm? Yet he faces the same problem Kant describes as afflicting citizens who 
believe they are wise because they have common sense. The ruler who appeals 
23 The word right is used here in the same manner as Kant used it when discussing a nation's right to wage 
war. 
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to his power to demonstrate his authority and the citizen who appeals to his 
common sense to demonstrate his wisdom are both committing the logical fallacy 
of appealing to authority. In his description of minority Kant describes appeals to 
authority as the "mechanical instruments of rational [ ... ]misuse" (Enlightenment 
17). Inheritance and genealogy are equivalent to the precepts and formula of 
misused reason called common sense. Like inheritance and genealogical claims 
to rule, common sense is common because it has an historical precedent. 
Unfortunately, doing something because it has always been done a particular 
way is not sufficient justification according to Kant. Yet, in the case of the dignity 
argument Kant follows his private duty to abide by the laws of his nation and 
respect Frederick's genealogical claim to the throne. 
In addition to being a logical fallacy, Kant calls appeals based on authority the 
"ball and chain of everlasting minority" (Enlightenment 17). The ball and chain of 
the unenlightened sovereign are his historical claims to rule and legislation based 
on heredity. He is inscribed by his historically contingent legitimacy. Thus the 
unenlightened sovereign cannot question his own path to power without 
undermining his own rule, any more than Kant can call openly for the 
enlightenment of the sovereign. There is no room for him to examine and change 
his claim to the throne; rather, he must reproduce and perpetuate the laws and 
customs which support his power. What this amounts to is the perpetuation and 
reproduction of war and violence, since historical claims to power are based on 
military conquests and that royal blood lines owe their purity to the heat of battle. 
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Kant, however, clearly states that military victory is not a justifiable 
foundation for legitimate rule because it is vulnerable and open to further violent 
challenges. By placing reason at the core of sovereignty Kant cauterizes the flow 
of royal blood that results from heredity and military power. Although Kant 
realizes that this is the only way to stem the flow of blood, he also realizes that to 
openly challenge historical legitimacy would be tantamount to throwing chum into 
water teaming with sharks. This is why he recommends that citizens ought to 
abide by the rule of revolutionary governments even though the means by which 
they seized power are not rationally valid. To the rational individual, it should be 
no less preferable to abide by and live under one irrational regime as opposed to 
another. The aim of the rational person would be to enlighten the regime so that 
its rulers find legitimacy through rational governance. The rational person is not 
moved toward insurrection because to do so would violate his or her private duty 
to follow the laws of his or her nation. Moreover, this is in line with their rationally 
determined public duty to promote perpetual peace. 
As I have shown in Chapter One, a nation that descends into a state of 
civil war is a danger to the peace process. Thus, the rational individual cannot 
promote civil unrest without running the risk of inviting foreign intervention in the 
affairs of their nation and promoting international unrest.24 This is why Kant 
24Kant negotiates the contingent and practical historical and political concerns surrounding the publication 
of the secret article in a manner not unlike his treatment of leges latae (see footnote 3). Like leges latae, 
the secret article is crafted in such a way as to permit a historically contingent condition to endure until a 
time when a more rational and enlightened solution may be enacted. The deference given to an 
unenlightened sovereign via the obligation incumbent upon a citizen by the private duty to respect the 
sovereign's dignity is akin to one's duty to abide by revolutionary regimes, and a nation's duties to abolish 
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chose the weaker of two arguments to justify the secret article. If he had openly 
voiced the stronger argument, any progress toward perpetual peace would be 
threatened. Just as you cannot openly legislate revolution if you wish to plan a 
secret coup, you cannot openly invalidate the legitimacy of the sovereign if you 
wish to avoid violent conflict. 
The practical demand of private duty required Kant to obfuscate the 
purpose of the secret article because the political nation in which he published 
Toward Perpetual Peace was historically conditioned and not theoretically 
perfect. The practical requirement provides the correct context for understanding 
the confusion ironic interpretations of the secret article encounter. As I have 
argued the claim that Kant let the cat out of the bag by publishing the secret 
article does not hold. The act of listening is not his secret to keep. In addition, the 
publication of the secret article does not undermine the theoretical requirement 
for the sovereign's enlightenment; rather, as a practical matter, its publication is 
potentially challenging to the sovereign's authority and thus must be tempered by 
the subjective defense. While the dignity defense does not hold theoretically, it is 
a successful practical response to the practical problem. The subjective defense 
preserves the sovereign's historically contingent authority, while creating the 
opportunity for the exercise of that authority to become enlightened. 
standing armies, discourage international debt, and repatriate displaced peoples (Preliminary Articles 2, 3, 
and 4). Like these examples the subjective defense is designed so that the enlightenment of the sovereign 
may be brought about over time as opposed to immediately and this is a necessary practical condition for 
the move toward perpetual peace. 
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Conclusion 
The Good of an Enlightened Sovereign 
What is Enlightenment focuses on the development of enlightenment of the 
public sphere within a nation state, yet the enlightenment of the sovereign, made 
possible by the secret article, suggests that the public sphere within the state 
may be extended beyond the nation to the realm of international relations. The 
second definitive article demonstrates that the relationships between nations 
cannot have the contractual character of intra-national constitutions. Hence, it is 
reasonable that a trust not founded on explicit constitutional duties may be 
established among an international community of enlightened sovereigns in the 
same manner that it is among the national community of enlightened citizens. 
Although citizens are bound by a constitution, public trust is established freely in 
accordance with reason. 
Since there are no structural constraints other than the limits of reason on 
public trust, and given that there are no contractual fetters on international 
relations, there is reason to believe that the trust created in the public sphere 
could be created in the international realm. Kant employs the secret article to 
bridge the gap between the public and international spheres, transferring a 
rationally based commodious environment of the one onto the other, thereby 
establishing a workable foundation for peace. By adding the secret article to his 
text, Kant situates the enlightenment and free rationality of the sovereign as the 
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grounds for moving toward peace. This foundation utilizes the legal mechanism 
necessary for reducing risk and increasing the likelihood of trust between nations 
without being a programmatic blueprint for a tinker toy international community. 
The secret article circumvents a mechanistic reading of Perpetual Peace. 
This is troubling to those optimists who wish to employ an ironic reading in an 
attempt to buttress peace with the binding grip of mechanical laws. Although 
inclusion of the secret article is troubling, Kant was concerned with the dangers 
of the mechanical approach to international relations. At best, such a 
mechanistic approach would become unreflective and blind to the value of public 
right. As Kant notes, a federation of states is preferable to a global government 
because "as the range of government expands, laws progressively lose their 
vigor, and a soulless despotism, after it destroys the seed of good, finally 
deteriorates into anarchy" (Peace 336). 
If the slow descent into anarchy is not a sufficient deterrent from brute 
mechanistic legalism, then an international sphere that is altogether without the 
secret article and the possibility of an enlightened sovereign would be an arena 
for perpetual war, the inhabitants of which would be tyrants, god heads, and 
strongmen who must protect their tenuous claims to sovereignty as fiercely as 
they protect their self-conceited claims to authority. Without a device within the 
state for the enlightenment of the sovereign, international relations between 
sovereigns would continue to be like Swift's bird house. In On the Common 
Saying, Kant states that an enduring peace predicated on a balance of power is 
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a "mere fantasy, like Swift's house that the builder had constructed in such 
perfect accord with all the laws of equilibrium that it collapsed as soon as a 
sparrow alighted upon it "(309).25 During a peace which is held together by power 
alone, it is not a question of "whether the house will or will not collapse." Rather, 
it is a question of which nation will exhaust their resources and power first. 
If international relations are to evolve beyond a state of war with 
intermittent stalemates that give an appearance of peace to a state of perpetual 
war, they must be built on a trust that is guaranteed by the free use of reason 
and enacted and secured by the free expression of citizens regarding matters of 
public policy. This conclusion follows the structural logic of Kant's definitive 
articles wherein federalism is premised on the republican constitution. However, 
the conclusion differs from the definitive articles in that it provides a solution to 
the conflict between national sovereignty and international government by 
placing the discussion outside of the explicit language of constitutions and 
contracts, i.e., the language of the private sphere, and places the discussion in 
the tacit language of the free use of reason and trust, that is, the language of the 
public sphere. When read in the context of What is Enlightenment it becomes 
apparent that the highest wisdom and inner reason of the sovereign is premised 
on an enlightened citizenry. While preserving the sovereign's authority the secret 
article is the linchpin that unites the enlightenment of the sovereign with the 
25 For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between Kant and Swift and Kant's reading of Swift 
please see (Axinn 246- 8; Fenves 97-99, 101; Wood 8). 
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enlightenment of his citizens, thereby introducing enlightenment into the 
international sphere and creating the possibility for perpetual peace. 
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